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HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY
Lawrence 0. Gostint
Much of the academic and policy discourse on the health care
system focuses on several fundamental goals: ensuring health cover-
age, equitable treatment, high quality services, and consumer choice
at a reasonable cost for individuals, employers, and the federal and
state governments. 1 The literature on health care systems characteris-
tically defends the particular author's preferred plan for restructuring
the market for health care services and/or financing of health insur-
ance.2 But achieving the goals listed above will require the develop-
ment of a sound health information infrastructure,3 irrespective of
any changes to the organization and finance of the health care system.
The ability of the health care system to function effectively depends in
t Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Adjunct Professor,
the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health; Co-Director, Georgetown-Johns
Hopkins Program on Law and Public Health. J.D., Duke University, 1974; LL.D. (hon.),
State University of New York, 1994. Although Professor Gostin chaired the Privacy Work-
ing Group of the President's Task Force on National Health Care Reform, the findings and
conclusions in this Article do not necessarily reflec the views of the White House. Profes-
sor Gostin acknowledges the members of the Privacy Working Group: Joan Turek-Brezina,
Madison Powers, Rene Kozloff, Ruth Faden, and Dennis Steinauer.
Professor Gostin wishes to thank Professors Anita L. Allen and Steven Goldberg of the
Georgetown University Law Center, Rene Kozloff of Kunitz & Associates; Joan Turek-Brez-
ina, Chair of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Task Force on the Pri-
vacy of Health Records; andJohn P. Fanning, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health.
He is also grateful for the research assistance of Barbara Looney and Marilyn Vadon. Fi-
nally, Professor Gostin acknowledges the support of the United States Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (particularly Verla Neslund in the Office of the General Counsel),
the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (particularly Willis Forrester), and the
Task Force for Child Survival and Development of the Carter Presidential Center (particu-
larly William C. Watson, Jr.) for enabling him to chair a national project on public health
information privacy.
1 See generally Dan W. Brock& Norman Daniels, EthicalFoundations of the Clinton Ad-
ministration's Proposed Health Care System, 271 JAMA 1189 (1994) (discussing the need for
comprehensive insurance coverage, equal access to health care, high-quality medical serv-
ices, individual choice in medical matters, and'cost control); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Foreword:
Health Care Reform in the United States-The Presidential Task Force, 19 AM. J.L. & MFn. 1, 2
(1993) (citing criticism of the current health system's failure to provide universal health
care with equitable sharing of benefits and burdens).
2 Compare Eli Ginzberg, Improving Health Care for the Poor. Lessons From the 1980s, 271
JAMA 464 (1994) and Paul D. Welistone & Ellen R. Shaffer, The American Health Security
Act-A Single-PayerProposal 328 NEv ENG.J. MED. 1489 (1993) (authors with social welfare
approaches) with Elizabeth McCaughey, No Exit: What the Clinton Plan WilDo for You, NEw
REIUBLc, Feb. 7, 1994, at 21 and Gail R. Wilensky, Health Reform: What Will it Take to Pass',
HEALTH Anw., Spring 1994, at 179 (authors who favor free market approaches).
3 For a definition of the term "health information infrastructure," see infra text ac-
companying note 24.
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part on the accuracy, currency, completeness, and availability of
health data.4 All participants in the system (patients, health care prov-
iders, payers, researchers, and regulators) need high quality informa-
tion for informed decisionmaking.
A health care system supported by data on almost any relevant
subject, accessible to a diverse and significant number of users, is an
integral part of the vision for health care reform.5 Plans for the sys-
tematic collection, storage, use, and dissemination of a huge volume
of uniform data sets in electronic form are already under way and
have an aura of inevitability. This new health information infrastruc-
ture is the subject of reports recently published, or in press, by the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment,6 the General Ac-
4 The term "health data" is broadly defined as all records that contain information
that describes a person's prior, current, or future health status, including aetiology, diag-
nosis, prognosis, or treatment, or methods of reimbursement for health services. Law-
rence 0. Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Personal Information in a New Health Care System,
270 JAMA 2487, 2488 (1993). Although these data are primarily held by members of the
health care system (e.g., hospitals, health plans, and physician offices), the public health
system (e.g., state or municipal health departments), and the health insurance system
(public or private entities that provide reimbursement for health care services), such data
also reside in an expansive array of record holders such as pharmacies, laboratories, re-
searchers, and employers. Id. Even entities that have little or no relationship to the provi-
sion or payment of health care, like credit card companies, banks, and direct marketers,
may hold or have access to health data. Id.
5 President Clinton's health care reform bill would have governed information sys-
tems and privacy and would have established a national health information system: "The
National Health Board shall develop and implement a health information system by which
the Board shall collect, report, and regulate the collection and dissemination of the health
care information .... " H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5101 (1994). Many other health
care reform bills in Congress would have achieved the same result. See, e.g., H.R. 1200,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 412, 486(A) (1993) (establishing the National Health Care Fraud
Data-Base and the National Data System and Clearinghouse on Primary Care and Preven-
tion Research, respectively); S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3301, 4121 (1993) (establish-
ing health care data interchange system, and health care fraud and abuse data collection
program, respectively). H.R. 1200 delineates the scope of such databases:
The Director of NIH ... shall establish a data system for the collection,
storage, analysis, retrieval, and dissemination of information regarding pri-
mary care and prevention research that is conducted or supported by the
national research institutes. Information from the data system shall be
available through information systems available to health care professionals
and providers, researchers, and members of the public.
H.R. 1200 § 486F, supra.
6 See CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN-
FORMATION TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY, OTA-CIT-
296 (1986) [hereinafter OTA FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY]; CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL INFORMATION,
OTA-TCT-576, 51-87 (1993) [hereinafter OTA PROTECTING PRIVACY]; CONGRESSIONAL OF-
FICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE: INFORMATION FOR CON-
SuMES, OTA-H-386 (1988) [hereinafter OTA INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS].
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counting Office, 7 the National Academy of Sciences," the Department
of Health and Human Services, 9 the Physician Payment Review Com-
mission,' 0 and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention."
Contrary to the assertions of some privacy advocates, powerful
reasons exist for the broad collection and use of health data. High
quality data are needed to help consumers make informed choices
among health plans and providers, to provide more effective clinical
care, to assess the quality and cost effectiveness of health services, to
monitor fraud and abuse, to track and evaluate access to health serv-
ices and patterns of morbidity and mortality among underserved
populations, and to research the determinants, prevention, and treat-
ment of disease.' 2
Aggressive collection of a broad range of personal data, however,
has a significant trade off in loss of privacy. American society places a
high value on individual rights, autonomous decisionmaking, and the
protection of the private sphere from governmental or other intru-
sion.' 3 Americans currently believe that their privacy rights are not
7 See INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY DivisIoN, GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, AUTOMATED MEDICAL RECORDS: LEADERSHIP NEEDED To EXPEDITE STANDARDS DE-
VELOPMENT, GAO/IMTEC-93-17 (1993) [hereinafter LEADERSHIP NEEDED]; INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH CARE IN-
FORMATION SYSrEMS: NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK CONTINUES TO EXPERIENCE
PROBLEMs, GAO/IMTEC-93-1 (1993); INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY DM-
SION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL ADP SYSTEMS: AUTOMATED MEDICAL RECORDS
HOLD PROMISE TO IMPROVE PATIENT CARE, GAO/IMTEC-91-5 (1991) [hereinafter MEDICJ
ADP SYMrEMS].
8 See COMMrITEE ON REGIONAL HEALTH DATA NE'wORxS, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCI-
ENCES, HE.ALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE: USE, DISCLOSURE, AND PRivAGY (Molla S.
Donaldson & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1994) [hereinafter HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION
AGE].
9 See TASK FORCE ON PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH
RECORDS: SOCIAL NEEDS AND PERSONAL PRIVACY. CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (1993); FIAL
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE PRIVACY OF MEDICAL RECORDS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. (forthcoming, 1995); WORK GROUP ON COMPUTERIZATION OF PATIENT
RECORDS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TOWARD A NATIONAL HEALTH INFORMA-
TION INFRASTRUCTURE (1993).
10 See PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 311-22
(1994) [hereinafter PPRC 1994]; PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RmEW CoMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 27-54 (1993) [hereinafter PPRC 1993]; PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, AN-
NUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 263-82 (1992) [hereinafter PPRC 1992].
11 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Council of State and Territo-
rial Epidemiologists, and the Task Force for Child Survival and Development are oversee-
ing a national study on the legal protection of public health and health care records with
special emphasis on data held by government departments, including HIV and child im-
munization records. The Georgetown\Johns Hopkins Program on Law and Public Health
is conducting the study with the author as principal investigator.
12 See infra notes 91-154 and accompanying text.
13 Concerns about privacy transcend the health care setting. See Domestic and Interna-
tional Data Protection Issues, Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Government Information,
Justice, and Agriculture of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) (testimony of Alan F. Westin, Professor of Law and Government, Columbia Univer-
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adequately protected. 14 In a 1993 Harris-Equifax poll specifically on
health information privacy, eighty percent of the respondents be-
lieved that consumers had lost all control over how medical informa-
tion about them is circulated and used. 15 Eighty-five percent of
respondents said that protecting the confidentiality of medical
records is an absolutely essential or very important part of national
health care reform; they put this priority even ahead of providing uni-
versal coverage, reducing paperwork burdens, and providing better
data for research into diseases and treatments.' 6 Public fear and dis-
trust of technology and bureaucracy are only likely to increase as col-
lection, storage, and dissemination of information becomes more
automated. 17 Health information is perhaps the most intimate, per-
sonal, and sensitive of any information maintained about an individ-
ual. As the nation's health care system grows in size, scope, and
integration, the susceptibility of that information to disclosure will
also increase.
Thoughtful scholarship in the area of informational privacy' s
sometimes assumes that a significant level of privacy can coexist with
sity, and Academic Advisor to the Equity Survey, How the American Public Views Consumer
Privacy Issues in the Early 90's-And Why); ALAN WESTIN Er AL., THE EQUIFAX REPORT ON
CONSUMERS IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1990) reprinted in id. at 290; PRIVACY PROTECTION
STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SocIETY (1977) [hereinafter PRIVACY
STUDY COMM'N].
14 Approximately 80% of those surveyed in public opinion polls consistently state that
they are "very" (49%) or "somewhat" concerned (30%) about threats to their personal
privacy in general. African Americans (86% concerned) and Hispanics (85% concerned)
express higher levels of apprehension with 69% and 62% respectively, stating that they are
"very" concerned about threats to personal privacy. ALAN F. WEsrN Er AL., HEALTH CARE
INFORMATION PRIVACY. A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND LEADERS 23 (1993) [hereinafter
HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY SURVEY] (survey conducted for Equifax, Inc.).
15 Id. at 2; see David McNaughton, Health Care Poll Finds Concerns About Privacy, AT-
LANTA CONST., Oct. 29, 1993, atH3; C.B. RodgersJr., It's Time for Serious Legislation toProtect
Medical Privacy, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1994, at A19 (chairman of Equifax, discussing the
policy implications of the HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY SURVEY, supra note 14).
16 HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 10.
17 In the HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 66-67, 29% of the
respondents stated that the fact that their health care providers use computers concerns
them; strong majorities felt that computer use causes billing mistakes (75%), leads to inac-
curate recordings of medical conditions (60%), and facilitates unauthorized disclosure of
sensitive information (63%). See also Medical Records Inst., The Challenge of the Next Two
Decades, ToWARD ELE=TONIC PATIENT REc., Dec. 1992, at 1; Jeff Goldberg, Who's Reading
Your Medical Records?, LEAR's, Nov. 1992, at 40.
18 Privacy, although a highly complex concept, can be defined as the right of individ-
uals to limit access by others to some aspect of their persons. This Article focuses on infor-
mational privacy-the ability of an individual to deny others access to information
regarding that individual. This Article is not concerned with decisional privacy-the free-
dom claimed by individuals to make intimate decisions about their bodily integrity without
interference. See generally ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE
Socirn, 11, 31-34 (1987) (discussing definitions of privacy, including one that is specific to
women's privacy concerns); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY AN ANTHOLOGY 346 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1984) (discuss-
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the development of a modem health information infrastructure.
Some commentators suggest that we can have it both ways: that ade-
quate legal protection of informational privacy will eliminate the need
to significantly limit the collection of health data. This Article demon-
strates that there is no such easy resolution of the conflict between the
need for information and the need for privacy. Because significant
levels of privacy cannot realistically be achieved within the health in-
formation infrastructure currently envisaged by policymakers, we con-
front a hard choice: should we sharply limit the systematic collection
of identifiable health care data in order to achieve reasonable levels of
informational privacy? The result of that choice would be to reduce
considerably the social good that would be achieved from the
thoughtful use of health data. Alternatively, we may decide that the
value of information collection is so important to the achievement of
societal aspirations for health that the law ought not promise absolute
or even significant levels of privacy at all, but rather should require
that the data be used only for authorized and limited purposes. As I
will show, the law at present neither adequately protects privacy nor
ensures fair information practices. Moreover, the substantial variabil-
ity in the law probably impedes the development of the kind of infor-
mation systems envisaged; such systems require access to data in many
jurisdictions, each of which has different legal standards.
Widely respected scholars such as Professor Alan F. Westin1 9 and
Professor Anita L. Allen 20 began the process of carefully scrutinizing
the meaning and boundaries of the modem concept of privacy.21
This Article builds on the work of these and other authors by develop-
ing a conceptual framework for a particular application of privacy-
health information privacy.2 2 The framework, like the earlier founda-
tional work, requires a rigorous analysis of several central issues. First,
ing a neutral definition of privacy, privacy as a shared value, and privacy as a legal concept)
[hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIvACV]; WA Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the
Law, 12 PHIL PUB. Arr. 269 (1983) (exploring the definition and the moral and legal
foundations of privacy); Judith J. Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF PIVACY, supra, at 289 (exploring the lack of clarity in definitions of privacy and
suggesting that privacy rights are derivative of other rights); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy [the Implicit Made Explicit], in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY, supra, at 272 (examining the extension of privacy rights to the realm of intangible
property).
19 See ALAN F. WESTN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967) [hereinafter WESTIN, PRivAcY];
ALAN F. WESTIN, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 500-50, COMPUTERS, HEALTH RECORDS,
AND CrrzEN RIGHTS (1976).
20 See A.LE, supra note 18.
21 For other influential studies, see SECRETARY'S ADvisoRY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED
PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, PUB. No. (OS) 73-
94, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973); PRIVACY STUDY COMM'N,
supra note 13.
22 Some thoughtful legal scholarship focused on this issue before the advent of mod-
em automated health systems and the health care reform debate. See, e.g., Wendy Parmet,
1995]
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the health information infrastructure must be defined; its methods of
collection, storage, use and transmission of information must be un-
derstood; and its public purposes must be evaluated. Second, the con-
cept of informational privacy must be applied to health data in order
to measure the probable diminution of privacy in a changing health
care system, and the extent to which government can honestly keep a
promise of privacy. Third, a careful examination of current constitu-
tional, statutory, and common law must be undertaken to determine
whether existing safeguards are adequate to protect health informa-
tion privacy. Moreover, it is necessary to inquire whether current pri-
vacy safeguards are based upon antiquated concepts of how data are
generated and used in a modem health system. Finally, ideas for bal-
ancing the public need for health information and individual claims
to privacy must be generated. In an attempt to reconcile these equally
compelling public and private claims, I will propose a federal preemp-
tive statute based on fair information practices.
I
HEALTH INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTrURE
The Institute of Medicine recently observed, "No one engaged in
any part of health care delivery or planning today can fail to sense the
immense changes on the horizon, even if the silhouettes of those
changes, let alone the details, are in dispute."23 The Institute was re-
ferring to the development of a national health information infra-
structure, which I define as the basic, underlying framework of
electronic information collection, storage, use, and transmission that
supports all of the essential functions of the health care system.2 4
These functions include clinical and prevention services, quality assur-
ance, financial reimbursement, monitoring of fraud and abuse, re-
search, and public health services.
Public Health Protection and the Privacy of Medical Records, 16 HitAv. C.RI-C.L L. REv. 265
(1981).
23 HEALT- DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 40. See also KAREN A.
DUNCAN, HEALTH INFORMATION AND HEALTH REFORM: UNDERSTANDING THE NEED FOR A NA-
TIONAL HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEM 274-94 (1994) (explaining in nontechnical terms the
role of information technology in alleviating the crisis in health care).
24 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services lists the following compo-
nents of a health information infrastructure: (i) "computer-based patient record (CPR)
systerns"-automated systems maintained by providers relating to specific patients, includ-
ing clinical, administrative, and payment data; (ii) electronic networks--CPR systems that
are "linked... through high-speed communication highways" using "standard definitions,
codes, and formats that enable data to be universally recognized and processed"; (iii) "ref-
erence data bases-aggregate data from many patients"; and (iv) "computerized knowl-
edge-based systems"-systems that "use decision logic and practice guidelines to help"
health care providers with diagnoses and treatment, and evaluate outcomes of health inter-
ventions. WORK GROUP ON COMPUTERIZATION OF PATIENT RECORDS, supra note 9, at 5.
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A. The Automation of Health Data
Currently, most individual health records are kept manually in
voluminous paper files. The General Accounting Office estimates
that the 34 million annual hospital admissions and 1.2 billion physi-
cian visits could generate the equivalent of 10 billion pages of medical
records.25 These records are fragmented, poorly documented and du-
plicative; they are often not accurate, complete, timely, or accessible
when needed for patient care.26 "Information about a single episode
of care could reside in the records of several different providers-
history and symptoms in a physician record, laboratory results and sur-
gical procedures in a hospital record, and rehabilitation in a homne
care agency record."27 Further, there are no systematic operational
models for the electronic storage of all aspects of health records.28
Despite the technical problems and the cost,29 several govern-
mental and private committees have proposed automation of health
data,30 and such automation is frequently discussed in the computer
and health care literature.31 The federal government specifically cites
the need for access to health data as one of the driving forces behind
25 LEADERSHIP NEEDED, supra note 7, at 2 n.2. For earlier accounts of the sheer vol-
ume of paper records in the health care system, see INsrrruTE OF MEDIINE, THE COM-
PUTER-BAsED PATirr RECORD: AN ESSENTIAL TECHNOLOGY FOR HEALTH CARE 12-14
(Richard S. Dick & Elaine B. Steen eds., 1991); PmivAcv PaOTcIoN STUDY COMM'N, supra
note 13, at 277.
26 LEADERSHIP NEEDED, supra note 7, at 2.
27 WORK GROUP ON COMPUTPIuZATION OF PATIENT RECORDS, supra note 9, at v.
28 MEDICAL ADP SysTEMS, supra note 7, at 21-22. The current inability to share medi-
cal information electronically stems largely from the lack of comprehensive standards for
automated medical records, including standards for structure and content, messaging, and
security. See Board of Directors of the American Medical Informatics Ass'n, Position Paper
Standardsfor Medical Identfiers, Codes, and Messages Needed to Create an Efficient Computer-Stored
Medical Record, J. AM. MED. INF RmATics ASS'N, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at I (proposing specific ap-
proaches to standardization in the areas of patient, provider, and site-of-care identifiers;
computerized health care message exchange; medical record content and structure; and
medical codes and terminologies).
29 See William M. Tiemey et al., Physician Inpatient Order Writing on Microcomputer Work-
stations: Effects on Resource Utilization, 269 JAMA 379 (1993).
30 INsrrtruTE OF MEDrICNE, supra note 25, at 32-35; MEDiCAL ADP Sysr.ms, supra note 7,
at 5; WORK GROUP ON COMPUTERIzATION OF PA-rENr RECORDS, supra note 9, at v-x; WORK-
GROUP FOR ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SFvs., OBSTACLES
TO EDI IN THE CURRENT HEALTH CARE INFRASTRuCTURE at iii-v (1992).
31 See, e.g., C. R. Gabriele & G. Murphy, Computerized Medical Records, 61 J. AM. MED.
REC. ASS'N 26 (1990); Medical Records Institute, The Process of Creating Elektronic Patient
Records, TowARD ELECTRONIC PATIENT REC. Oct. 1992, 1, 2. The mission of the Computer-
Based Patient Record Institute, established in 1992 as a result of a report by the Institute of
Medicine, is to "initiate and coordinate urgently needed activities to facilitate and promote
the routine use of computer-based patient records throughout health care." COMPuTER-
BASED PATIENT RECORD INSTn., VISION STATEMENT (1992) (The Computer-Based Patient
Record Institute (CPRI) is a consortium of provider groups, medical informatics experts,
businesses, vendors, and insurers).
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its initiative for a national information superhighway.3 2 Three con-
ceptual and technological innovations are likely to accelerate the pace
of automation of health records: the development of a patient-based
longitudinal health record, the assignment of a unique identifier to
every American, and the eventual use of advanced technologies for
health identification cards.
1. Patient-Based Longitudinal Health Records
The demand for accurate, complete, current, and accessible elec-
tronic data is emerging in an environment in which the existing auto-
mated systems are already undergoing significant change.3 3 Although
many health records have long existed in automated form, they have
traditionally supported only specific functions, such as those of the
laboratory, pharmacy, or finance department A shift to patient-based
longitudinal health records, now visualized as part of longer-term ef-
forts toward building national health information networks, would
fundamentally change the nature of existing record systems. Patient-
based longitudinal health records are not merely automated versions
of current records. They are patient-specific records in automated
form containing all data relevant to the health of an individual (e.g.,
clinical, financial, and research-oriented information, including diag-
nostic images)3 4 collected over a lifetime.3 5 What is foreseen, then, is
a single record for every person in the United States, continually ex-
panded from prebirth to death and accessible to a wide range of indi-
viduals and institutions for a variety of purposes.
2. Health Identification Cards and Unique Identfiers
Under virtually all proposals for a national health care system,
health identification cards would be issued to eligible persons, enti-
32 WORK GROUP ON COMPUTERIZATION OF PATIENT RECORDS, supra note 9, at 8; see COM-
PUT R SrsTEms PoucY PROJECt, PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRAsTRUC-
TURE: CSPP's VISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 1 (1993) (calling for a public-
private partnership to develop a national information infrastructure that would link institu-
tions and resources throughout the country).
33 See generally MEDICAL RECORDS INsTiT., TOWA D AN ELECTRONIC PATIENT RECORD '94:
TENTH INTERNATIONAL SymPOSIUM ON THE CREATION OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND
SIXTH GLOBAL CONGRESS ON PATIENT CARDS (Peter Waegemann ed., 1994).
34 Medical imaging includes diagnostic images or pictures obtained from film scan-
ners, computed radiography (CR), magnetic resonance (MR), computed tomography
(CT), ultrasound, and nuclear medicine sources; the increasing digitization of data is rap-
idly expanding horizons for computerizing such images. INsTrrUTE OF MEDICIME, supra
note 25, at 65.
35 See Sheri Alpert, Smart Cards, Smarter Policy: Medical Records, Privacy, and Health Care
Reform, 23 HASTINGS CmR. REP., Nov.-Dec., 1998, at 13-14 ("Most envision a comprehensive
electronic 'cradle to grave' medical file on every individual in the United States covered by
health insurance.").
[Vol. 80:451
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fling them to register and to receive certain health care services.3 6
Even in the absence of national reform, health identification cards are
likely to emerge at both the federal and state level. Health identifica-
tion cards could be used in federal programs such as Medicare, Medi-
caid, and the Veterans Administration; in health care reform
programs initiated by the states; and in health plans offered by large
self-insured employers, health insurance companies, and health main-
tenance organizations that operate regionally or nationally.
Using health identification cards, eligible individuals would re-
ceive a unique identifier for the efficient operation of the health care
system or health insurance plan. The unique identifier might be as-
signed at birth and stay fixed throughout the life span. It would be
used for a variety of health, administrative, financial, statistical, and
research purposes. It would provide access to care and to reimburse-
ment for services rendered. The identifier would also point to the
correct patient records, and establish longitudinal and geographic
links among a patient's health care records in order to improve pa-
tient care, analyze patterns of health services, identify fraudulent activ-
ities, and provide a more detailed examination and evaluation of the
health care system.37
Perhaps the most controversial decision regarding privacy and se-
curity in the use of health identification cards is whether to utilize the
Social Security number (SSN) as the individual identifier. Almost all
of the recent health care initiatives have proposed using the SSN as
the unique personal identifier because it provides the most cost effec-
tive and timely method of identifying individuals and reliably collect-
ing personal information.38 However, the SSN at present is not a
completely reliable identifier: it is not unique (there are multiple
users of single numbers) and it is difficult to determine whether a
random nine-digit number is a valid SSN. The process of verifying the
identities of all holders and reissuing Social Security cards would cost
between $1.5 to $2.5 billion.3 9
36 See, e.g., Health SecurityAct, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1stSess. § 103(c) (1993) (eli-
gible individuals are entitled to a health security card entitling them to a comprehensive
benefits package).
37 See COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON DATA PROTECTION, THE INTRODUCTION AND USE OF
PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS: THE DATA PROTECTION ISSUES 19-20 (1991).
38 E.g., Health Care Cost Containment and Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 200, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); The Medical and Health Insurance Reform Information Act of
1992, H.R. 5464, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Other systems for assigning numbers were
discussed in AMERicAN SOCIETY FOR TEsTING AND MATERIALS, GUIDE FOR UNIQUE HEALTH
CA IDENTIFIER MODEL (1993).
39 Hearing on the Use of the Social Security Number as a National Identifier Before the Sub-
comm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25
(1991) (statement by Gwendolyn S. King, Commissioner of Social Security).
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According to those who support its wide-scale use in the new
health care system, the SSN would create little additional risk to pri-
vacy. They argue that any unique identifier adopted for health care
purposes would quickly end up in wide circulation. Certainly, a wide
variety of authorized users would have access to the unique identifier,
ranging from hospitals and health care providers to administrators,
insurers, and regulators. Keeping unique identifiers truly private
would be difficult Further, Congress or possibly the executive branch
could subsequently authorize use of the unique identifier to achieve
other goals, such as identifying illegal immigrants.
To many civil libertarians, however, the SSN presents the gravest
potential for privacy invasion that is possible with a unique health care
identifier.40 They are disturbed by the proliferation of the SSN for
purposes unrelated to the administration of the Social Security system
and the use of the number to uncover and link databases on many
aspects of a person's life. 41 Since the SSN originated in 1936, it has
been used extensively for a large variety of purposes that are not re-
lated to social security.42 Although the Privacy Act of 1974 makes it
unlawful for a government agency to deny a right, benefit or privilege
because of a refusal to disclose a SSN, several federal departments do
use these numbers, including the Internal Revenue Service, Depart-
ment of Defense, Parent Locator Service, Food Stamp Program, and
Selective Service system.43 The SSN is also widely used in other gov-
ernment agencies and in the private sector, including debt collectors,
40 See generaly DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES:
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 15-
16 (1989) (arguing there is a rational fear of the record linkages possible under a system
using personal identification numbers); G.T. Marx, The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove: Totali-
tarian Potentials Within Democratic Strumtures, in THE SOCIAL FABRIC: DIMENSIONS AND ISSUES
135 (J.E. Short, Jr. ed., 1986) (arguing that advancing technology increases the totalitarian
potential of democracy).
41 See SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON AuToMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMs,
supra note 21, at 121; ALAN E. WESTIN & MICHAEL A. BAKER, NATIONAL ACADE Y OF SCIENCE
DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 399 (1972); Willis H. Ware, The New Faces ofPivacy, 9 THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 195, 197-98 (1993).
42 See Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1352 (4th Cir. 1993); OFFICE OF THE INSPEC-
TOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEATH & HuMAN SERVS., THE ExTENT AND USE OF SOCIAL
SECURITY NUMBERS at i-ii (1988); OTA PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 64-65; Ware,
supra note 41, at 197-98.
43 Congress has given certain federal agencies statutory authority to use social security
numbers. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6109 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (authorizing the use of social
security numbers as identifiers for income tax purposes). In addition, the Privacy Act pro-
hibition on the use of the Social Security number has a grandfather clause. See Privacy Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 7(a) (2) (B), 88 Stat. 1897. Thus, use of the social security
number may have an explicit statutory foundation. The real privacy problem, therefore, is
not necessarily legal, but a more basic policy problem (an instructive one). Congress can
enact a law restricting the use of data on privacy grounds, but the pressures to use the data
are considerable. A future Congress can authorize the use of the data for specific pur-
poses, thus undermining the original privacy objective.
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department stores, utilities, check validation services, supermarkets,
cable television, credit card issuers, banks, major oil companies, mail-
ing list companies, credit bureaus, insurance companies, the Medical
Information Bureau, motor vehicle departments, law enforcement
agencies, employers, schools, and universities. 44 The extensive use of
the SSN in the public and private sectors leads to the concern that it
has become a de facto national identifier.45 One privacy advocate
noted:
Not only does the SSN make it easier for large institutions to com-
pare their databases, it allows curious individuals (including private
detectives, computer hackers or other strangers you might not want
snooping into your private life) to 'hop' from database to database
and draw out a profile of your buying habits and personal lifestyle.46
An alternative to the SSN that would better protect consumer pri-
vacy would be a number with no use other than for the health care
system. Each person's health insurance number, then, would become
just as private as his or her health record: disclosure of the number
would be limited to those authorized to view the patient's health rec-
ord; penalties would be established for unauthorized disclosure of the
number; use of the number would be limited to approved health pur-
poses; and the number could not be used to link health care databases
with those found in other data systems.
3. Electronic Card Technologies
Future information systems incorporating unique identifiers may
rely on advanced card technologies that are capable of storing sub-
stantial data on the card holder's health and finances. 47 Four types of
plastic wallet-sized cards could be used for the collection, retention,
use, and disclosure of portable files of personal information:48 em-
44 In Gredinger, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals presented a detailed explanation
of "the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal informa-
tion in computerized data banks or other massive government files" often unlocked by the
SSN. 988 F.2d at 1353.
45 See generallyJo ANNE C. BRUCE, PRIvAcY AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN-
FORMATION (2d ed. 1988); FLAHET Y, supra note 40, at 15-16, 406.
46 Use of Social Security Number as a National Identifier, Heafings Before the Subcomm. on
Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Aeans, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 101, 106 (1991)
(testimony of Evan Hendricks, publisher and editor, Privacy Times).
47 See TOM WiHT, HEALTH CARD TECHNOLOGr. A PRIrVAcY PERSPEC--VE (1992) 1-2
[hereinafter HEALTH CARD TEcHNOLOGY]; OTA PROTFcGING PmvAcS, supra note 6, at 55-64;
Alpert, supra note 35, at 14.
48 HALTH CARD TECHNOLOGy, supra note 47, at 3-4.
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bossed,49 magnetic strip,50 integrated circuit,5' and optical storage
cards.52 Integrated circuit cards that have the capacity not only to
store information, but also to manipulate that information, are often
called "smart cards."53 Smart cards provide a medium for the storage
of the equivalent of 800 printed pages. Since the mid-1980s, approxi-
mately 100 pilot projects using electronic card technologies have been
initiated in health care systems internationally, including projects in
Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Italy, Great Britain, and Sweden.s4
Although privacy advocates in the United States have expressed con-
cern, 55 current health care proposals do not incorporate the use of
electronic card technologies. 56
Advocates of electronic card technology see it as a means of im-
proving the accuracy, completeness, and accessibility of information.
Smart cards hold the potential for improving the quality of health
services (particularly emergency services), reducing paperwork, and
containing costs associated with the processing of payment claims.
Smart cards could also be used as part of an access control system to
protect personal data. The memory of a smart card could be divided
into several zones, each with different levels of access and security.
Public zones could contain the card holder's identification while us-
age zones could contain emergency information, vaccination history,
and medical history.57 Confidential and secret zones could contain
49 The embossed card has raised letters containing only the information appearing
on its surface. Id.
50 Magnetic strip cards add magnetic recording media to the back of an embossed
card. While the stripes can hold up to 1200 bits of information or more, they are primarily
used to access central databases. Access is obtained through use of the card in conjunction
with a personal identification number (PIN). Id. at 3.
51 Integrated circuit cards utilize a microchip imbedded into an embossed card.
Memory chip cards can be used only to store information. Smart cards can be program-
med with sophisticated security and have the capacity to manipulate data without being
connected to a central database. Id. at 3-4.
52 Optical storage cards use laser technology similar to that used for compact discs.
Optical storage cards are being developed to hold up to 16 million bits of information and
allow the storage of digitized images such as X-rays and ultrasound photographs. Id. at 4.
53 Smart cards are defined as "a credit card-sized device containing one or more inte-
grated circuit chips, which perform the functions of a microprocessor, memory, and an
input/output interface." OTA PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 55.
54 See HEALTH CARD TEcHNOLOGY, supra note 47, at 7-10; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra
note 25, at 78-79; OTA PROTECrING PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 59-62; Simon Davies, Identity
Cards: National Proposals Increase, INT'L PPrVACY BULL., Apr.-June 1994, at 1.
55 See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Taking the Patient's View of Health Care Reform, J. Am.
HEALTH POL'v, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 27; William M. Bulkeley, Get Ready for Smart Cards in
Health Care, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1993, at B1h; Williamson M. Evers, 'Smart Card' is Scary
Proposal PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 6, 1993, at 7B.
56 WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POL'Y CoUNCi., THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH SECURITY PLAN
124 (1993) ("The card itself contains a minimal amount of information.").
57 OTA PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 55-58 (citing MARTHA E. HAuitN & ROB-
ERT BJ. WARNAR, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SMART CARD TECHNOLOGY. NEW METHODS FOR
COMPUTER ACCESS CONTROL 13-26 (1988)).
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more sensitive information such as sexual or needle-sharing behaviors
and psychiatric diagnoses.58 Several technologies are available to re-
strict access to sensitive data, including personal identification, user
verification, and cryptography.59
Sharp divisions exist as to whether smart cards would solve or ex-
acerbate privacy problems in automated information systems. If smart
cards were to replace central or linked databases, they could give con-
sumers greater knowledge of information contained in their files,
greater control over access, and tighter security. However, because
smart cards would inevitably duplicate information contained in other
systems, it is unlikely they would significantly increase informational
privay.60 Smart cards would also have value to third parties for mar-
keting, insurance, or media coverage of public figures, so they would
be vulnerable to theft or fraudulent use.
B. Electronic Interchange of Health Data: The Development of
Comprehensive Health Databases and Networks
The future health care information infrastructure will not merely
contain automated records within each relevant institution. It will also
electronically connect each of the vital components of the health care
system, permitting the rapid exchange of health information and the
processing of financial transactions.61
Health database organizations (HDOs) have already accelerated
the process of collection, storage, and use of electronic data.62 HDOs
operate under the authority of government, private, or not-for-profit
organizations. They have access to databases of health information
and have as their chief mission the public release of data and of analy-
ses- performed on the data. HDOs serve specific geographic areas and
58 Id.
59 Cryptography is used to encode data in order to provide privacy, authenticate
messages, and create digital signatures which protect against fraud. OTA PROTECTrNG PRI-
vAcY, supra note 6, at 91. See CONGRESSIONAL OFFiCE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFEND-
ING SECRETS, SHARING DATA: NEW LOcKS AND KEYS FOR ELECTRONIC INFORMATION, OTA-
CIT-b10, 174-80 (1987) [hereinafter OTA DEFENDING SECRETS].
60 If information on the smart card were not duplicated or "backed up" in other sys-
tems, data essential to the patient's care might be lost, damaged, stolen, or forgotten when
required for services.
61 WORKGROUP FOR ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS.: REPORT TO THE SECRETARY (1992). See WoRK GROUP ON COMPUTERIZATION OF PA-
TIENT RECORDS, supra note 9, at 5.
62 Building on the proposal of the Institute of Medicine for health database organiza-
tions, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has recommended the estab-
lishment of "health data institutes" in every state charged with the design and production
of "community health report cards." Edward L. Baker et al., Health Reform and the Health of
the Public: Forging Community Health Partnerships, 272 JAMA 1276, 1279 (1994). "Using data
generated by managed care providers, public health agencies, community hospitals, and
other sources provided through new electronic networks, these institutes would provide
extensive, up-to-date community health information." Id.
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hold comprehensive health status data on all persons in a defined
population.63 HDOs acquire data from individual health records cur-
rently kept by physicians and hospitals. They also collect information
from a wide variety of secondary sources: financial transactions from
private insurance companies and government programs; public
health surveillance and tracking systems; epidemiological, clinical, be-
havioral, and health services research; surveys conducted by govern-
ment, academics, and private foundations; and numerous other data
sources. The data collected include patient identified and patient
identifiable data, as well as aggregate (nonidentifiable) data. They
also include data on the performance of physicians and other health
care providers."
The development of population-wide health databases is not a
distant concept, but a reality. At present, numerous health databases
exist to support specific purposes.65 These databases include informa-
tion on medical cost reimbursement programs such as Medicaid or
63 HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 54; see WHrr HousE Do-
MESTIC POL'Y COUNCIL, supra note 56 ("An electronic network of regional centers contain-
ing enrollment, financial, and utilization data is created.").
64 The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-
11152 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), established the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), to
support and encourage peer review and as a source of information for credentialing agen-
cies. The NPDB, which is maintained by the Unisys Corporation under contract with the
Department of Health and Human Services, serves as a central source of information con-
cerning the practices of physicians. Barry R- Furrow, Quality Control in Health Care: Develop-
ments in the Law of Medical Malpractice, 21J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 173, 185 (1993). Information
on medical malpractice actions, settlement claims, disciplinary actions, and decisions by
health care facilities is contained in the database. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11133 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
65 See, e.g., Robert S. Boyd, Medical Databanks'Expansion Spurs Privacy Fears, Amiz. RE-
PUBLIC, Feb. 21, 1994, atAl (discussing privacy implications of Arizona Medical Communi-
cations Network which links data systems in hospitals with private physicians and insurance
carriers).
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Medicare, 66 hospital discharges,67 health status,68 health policy re-
search,69 utilization and cost effectiveness, 70 specific diseases such as
cancer,7 1 and immunization registries. 72 Health databases are con-
66 HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERvs., MEDICARE Hos-
PrrAL MORTALrIY INFORMATION, 1990 (1991); HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., MEDICARE HOSPITAL MORTALIY INFORMATION, 1986 (1987).
67 State statutes provide for collection of data for assessment of cost, utilization, qual-
ity-of-care, or a combination of the three. See Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-125.05 (1990);
AR. CODE ANN. § 20-8-110(a) (Michie 1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.31 (West
1991); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-28-103 (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2001-
2004 (Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-325 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.05 (West 1994);
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-281 (1982); HAw. REV. STAT. § 321-230 (1993); ILL ANN. STAT. ch.
410, para. 52012 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-21-6-6 (Bums 1993 & Supp.
1994); IowA CODE ANN. § 145.3 (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6801 (1994); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 211.464 (Baldwin 1993); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 40:2743 (West Supp. 1995);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 394 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-107
(1988); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 25A (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT.
§ 62J.30 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-676 (1994); NEv. REv. STAT. Am. § 439A.082 (Michie
1991 & Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 126:1 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-5.1
(West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14a-3 (Michie 1978); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-b
(McKinney 1991); N.C. GFN. STAT. § 131E-210 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23.01.1 (1991 &
Supp. 1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3732.11-.15 (Anderson 1994); 63 OuL.. STAT. tit. 63,
§§ 5010-5015 (1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 442.120 (1989); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 449.1-19
(1991); 1.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-10 (1989 & Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 446-170(c)
(Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. 1-43-19 (1993); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-1-108 (1992 & Supp. 1994); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 311.031-.038
(West 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-33a-104 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 1952 (1993);
VA. CODE ANN. § 9-166.1 (Michie 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.170.100 (West 1991);
W. VA. CODE § 16-1-10 (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 153.05 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); see also
NATIONAL ASS'N OF HEALTH DATA ORG., THE STATE HEALTH DATA RESOURCE MANUAL: Hos-
pITAL DISCHARGE DATA SysrEms (1993); Douglas Sharrott, vider-Specl] Quali~of-Care
Data: A Promposalfor Limited Mandatoiy Disclosure, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 85, 104 (1992).
68 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS.,
PUBLIC USE DATA TAPE: NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEw SURVEY, 1991 (1993).
69 AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POL'Y AND RESEARCH, AHCPR PuRPoSE AND PROGRAMS
(1990).
70 SeeJOSEPH P. NEwHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE EXPERIMENT (1993).
71 The National Cancer Data Base, for example, was established jointly by the Ameri-
can College of Surgeons and the American Cancer Society in 1989. The database is the
first large-scale national reporting system tracking trends in cancer treatments and their
effects on cancer survival rates longitudinally. The database has two components: (1) a
national tumor registry and (2) an assessment and surveillance mechanism consisting of a
nationwide network of clinicians. The National Cancer Data Base Project, ajoint project
of the American College of Surgeons and the American Cancer Society, Chicago, IL, is
discussed in Herman 1. Menck, A Preliminary Study of National Cancer Data Base Representa-
tives: National Cancer Data Base Annual Review of Patient Care 1993, CANCER NEWS, June 22,
1993, at 1.
72 Improved monitoring of disease and vaccination coverage is a central part of the
Childhood Immunization Initiative launched by President Clinton. U.S. DEP'T OF HALTH
& HUmAN SERvs., THE CHILDHOOD IMMUmzATIoN INrrTIAnE (1994). The House and Sen-
ate Appropriations Committees included a small fiscal year 1994 funding allocation for the
Department of Health and Human Services to establish a national immunization tracking
system. Several congressional bills have proposed the development of a national registry
system. See, e.g., The Organ Transplant Program Reauthorization Act, H.R. 2659, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1994); Comprehensive Child Immunization Act, S. 732, 103 Cong., 1st
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trolled by federal departments such as the Department of Defense73
and Veterans Administration, 74 which are automating their health in-
formation systems across their medical treatment facilities worldwide;
and the Public Health Service, which collects data on the health status
of large populations.75 The Department of Defense system includes a
Sess. (1993). Both the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation ("All- Kids Count" Program) have funded municipal or statewide im-
munization registry systems that maintain core data on the vaccination history of children,
including the name and several identifying characteristics of the child and parents. See Kay
Johnson & Joel Breman, Immunization Registry and Reminder Systems: More Progress
Needed to Increase U.S. Coverage Levels (Feb. 1994) (same) (on file with author). A few
state and city health departments (e.g., Arkansas, Delaware, San Antonio, and Detroit)
have developed automated immunization data systems. LARRY BLUMEN, CrS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, PROPOSAL FOR THE STATEWIDE IMMUNIZATION INFORMATION SYSTEM (1994). The
New York City Health Department has also proposed legislation to establish an Immuniza-
tion Registry. Board of Health, Dep't of Health, Notice of Intention to Adopt section 11.04
and Subsection (d) of Section 11.07 of the New York City Health Code (Nov. 9, 1993); see
also Elizabeth R. Zell et al., Low Vaccination Levels of U.S. Preschool and School-Age Children:
Retrospective Assesments of Vaccination Coverage, 1991-1992, 271JAMA 833 (1994) (estimating
percentages of preschool and school-age children by surveying school immunization
records); infra note 117 (discussing immunization levels). Recently, the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services recommended a comprehensive immunization information
system consisting of registries, computerized reminders, and recall. NATIONAL VACCINE AD.
VISORY COMM. ON VACCINATION REGISTRIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DEVEL-
OPING A NATIONAL CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION INFORMATION SYSTEM: REGISTRIES, REMINDERS,
AND RECALL (1994).
73 "The Composite Health Care System (CHCS) is a medical information system that
the Department of Defense is developing for use in its more than 690 medical treatment
facilities worldwide." INFORMATION MANAGEMENT & TECHNOLOGY Div., GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, CHCS DEPLOYMENT STRATEGY, GAO/IMTEC-91-47 at 1 (1991). CHCS is a state-of-
the-art, integrated medical information system designed to improve the timeliness, availa-
bility, and quality of health care data. Id. at 2. "CHCS will replace manual and automated
information systems now supporting Defense medical treatment facilities." Id. The GAO
has been conducting a series of studies on integrated health information systems for the
Department of Defense, the Veterans Administration, and nonfederal hospitals. See GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ADP SYSTEMS: EXAMINATION OF NoN-FEDERAL HOSPITAL INFoRMA-
TION SYSTEMS, GAO/IMTEC-87-21 at 3 (1987); see also Technology/Private Sector One Step
Ahead of Public Policy Debate in Health Care Reform, PR Newswire, Apr. 1, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS file (noting that integrated health information systems at
U.S. military facilities around the world contribute to market demand for more efficient
technologies).
74 The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) operates the Decentralized Hospital
Computer Program (DHCP), the country's largest health information system. James M.
Smith, DHCP's a Tool for Health Care, 10 GOV'T COMPTrrER NEWS 109 (1991). The VH's
tool for delivering health care is in place at 167 hospitals, 229 outpatient clinics, 122 nurs-
ing homes, and 27 veterans homes. Id. at 109. These facilities support 1.1 million inpa-
tients, 23.9 million outpatients and over 6 million records. Id. at 101; see alsoJames M.
Smith, VA Acknowledges Software Problems, 10 GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS 1 (1991) (describing
management and technical problems with DHCP); VA Asks for Vendors' Comments on Early
Plans for HOST System, 12 GOV'T COMPTER NEWS 6 (1993) (describing the VA's Hybrid
Open Systems Technology (HOST) program, developed in response to criticism of
DHCP).
75 See NATIONAL CIR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 68; NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES: CONFIDENTIALITY AN ACCESSIBILITY OF Gov-
ERNMENT STATISTICS 15-43 (George T. Duncan et al. eds., 1993) (discussing how federal
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comprehensive genetic database.7 6 State agencies also maintain large
databases, including integrated information systems as part of state
health care reform.7 Other health databases are established by hospi-
tal consortia, philanthropic foundations, or special authorities created
under state law.78 National, regional, and statewide databases are rap-
idly becoming repositories of a vast amount of information that could
be of considerable interest for clinical, empirical, statistical, public
health, epidemiological, educational, criminal justice, and commer-
cial purposes.
One problematic source of information is previously stored tissue
samples. Stored tissue samples may be regarded as inchoate data ba-
statistical agencies can preserve the confidentiality of their data and also meet the legiti-
mate needs of users); Sandra Smith, National Center for Health Statistics Data Line, 108 PuB.
HEALTH REP. 408, 409 (1993).
76 The DOD's Registry and Specimen Repository for Remains Identification was au-
thorized by the Secretary of Defense on December 16, 1991, to serve as an improved
method for the identification of soldiers' remains. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memoran-
dum No. 47803 (Dec. 16, 1991) (not available for public release). Recognizing that mod-
em warfare has the capacity to destroy human bodies beyond recognition by traditional
fingerprint or dental analysis, the new system relies on DNA analysis to permit positive
identification of remains, complementing these existing identification procedures. Memo-
randum from Enrique Mendez, Jr., M.D., the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Assistant Secretaries of Defense,
General Counsel, and Assistants to the Secretary of Defense (Jan. 5, 1993) (regarding es-
tablishment of a repository of specimen samples to aid in remains identification using
genetic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis).
77 In April of 1992, Vermont enacted legislation to commence formal planning for a
health care system that provides universal coverage to its citizens. Marilyn Moon & John
Holahan, Can States Take the Lead in Health Care Reformn, 268JAMA 1588, 1590-91 (1992).
The method of providing care introduced and implemented by the state will emphasize
integrated systems of care, with networks of physicians, hospitals, clinics, home health
agencies, and mental health providers. Janice Somerville, Vermont Reform on Schedule: Au-
thority Unveils Two Reform Options, 36 Am. MED. Nmvs 2 (1993). To carry out this goal, the
legislation creates a unified health care database. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9410 (Supp.
1994). This database, which is established and maintained by the Vermont Health Care
Authority, is used to determine the capacity of existing resources, identify needs, evaluate
effectiveness, compare costs of alternative approaches, and provide information to con-
sumers and purchasers. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9410(a) (1)-(5) (1993). For health
care information systems established in other states, see NATIONAL ASS'N OF HEmTH DATA
ORGS., THE STATE HEALTH DATA RESOURCE MANUAL: HosPrrAL DiscHARO, DATA SYSTEMS
(1998); Edward L. Hannan et al., Investigation of the Relationship Between Volume and Mortality
for Surgical Procedures Performed in New York State Hospitals, 262 JAMA 503, 504 (1989)
(describing research based on a database maintained by the New York State Department of
Health).
78 In 1980, nine Rochester hospitals joined with local Blue Cross, Medicare, and
Medicaid offices to form a not-for-profit membership corporation, called the Rochester
Area Hospitals Corporation, to cut the costs of health care in their community. SeeJames
A. Block et al., A Community Hospital Payment Expe7iment Outperforms NationalExperiences: The
Hospital Experimental Payment Program in Rochester, N.Y, 57 JAMA 193, 193-94 (1987). A
health database was created to pool care information from all nine hospitals. Id. at 194-95.
With the data received on inpatients, the corporation can provide both financial and
clinical analyses to hospitals. Id. at 195; Ruthanne Sutor, The Rochester Experiment, FnN.
WoRnD, Jan. 10, 1989, at 18 (describing the success of the Rochester system).
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ses because the technology exists to extract from them a vast amount
of current and future health data.' 9 The public health and research
communities have shown increasing interest in using existing tissue
samples for genetic testing and for creating new genetic databases.80
In some cases genomic information is being extracted from large col-
lections of tissue samples which were stored well before the advent of
genetic testing; any consent that may have been obtained originally
for tissue samples did not even envisage future genetic applications.
The most prominent example of an inchoate genetic database is
the Guthrie spot program, whereby dried blood spots are taken from
virtually all newborns throughout the United States.8 ' The genetic
composition of Guthrie spots remains stable for many years and, if
frozen, can reveal genetic data indefinitely. A recent survey found
that three-quarters of the states store their Guthrie cards, with thir-
teen storing them for over five years. Several states store these cards
indefinitely, and a number of states express an intention to do so. 82
Only two states require parental consent for the blood spot.
Other tissue repositories have been created especially for genetic
research. The federal government, for example, operates or funds a
number of these DNA databases, such as the cancer tissue repository
of the National Cancer Center of the National Institutes of Health.
These government-operated repositories are obliged to comply with
regulations designed, among other things, to ensure ethical review of
human subject research.88 Other repositories are purely private and
remain unregulated. For example, the University of Utah has devel-
oped a human tissue repository for genetic research that is funded
without federal dollars.
Perhaps the most ambitious public or private effort to create a
database with both genetic and non-genetic applications is the Na-
tional Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) con-
ducted by several federal agencies.84 NHANES has collected
comprehensive health status data in patient-identifiable form on some
79 Genetic research usually requires only DNA, which can be isolated from any nucle-
ated cells. Tissue samples that can serve as DNA sources include not only solid tissues, but
also blood, saliva, and any other nucleated cells. See Ellen W. Clayton, Informed Consent
for Genetic Research on Stored Tissue Samples (July 7, 1994) (unpublished background
paper for NIH/CDC Meeting on Informed Consent in Genetic Research, on file with the
author).
80 Id.
81 For example, all states screen newborns for PKU and congenital hyperthyroidism,
as well as other genetic defects.
82 Jean E. McEwen & Philip R. Reilly, Stored Guthrie Cards as DNA "Banks", 55 AM. J.
HUM. GENmcs 196, 196-97 (1994).
83 Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1993).
84 D_ ARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN Sravs., NATIONAL HEALTH AND NUTRrTON EXAM-
INATION SURVEY Il (1994).
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40,000 Americans in eighty-one counties in twenty-six states. This
sample represents all population groups; with an overrepresentation
of children, older persons, African Americans, and Mexican Ameri-
cans. Each subject undergoes an extensive physical and dental exami-
nation. Some five hundred pieces of data are collected from each
subject, ranging from socio-demographics, diet, bone density, and
blood pressure, to risk status, drug use, and sexually transmitted dis-
eases. Additionally, NHANES tests and stores biological samples for
long-term follow-up and statistical research.
NHANES provides a classic illustration of a massive collection of
highly personal and sensitive information by the federal government
that has enduring societal importance. These data pose a significant
risk of privacy invasion, but are critical to understanding health
problems in the population.
C. A Health Information Infrastructure Under a National
Health Care System
An organized strategy for the use of health information is an inte-
gral component of a national health care system. 5 The President's
Task Force on National Health Care Reform,8 6 together with most of
the health care bills before Congress in 1994,87 would have put in
place a nationally coordinated system of health information. Any new
proposals should include a method for collecting accurate and com-
prehensive data to inform consumer choice, monitor patient care,
and assess system performance, as well as a method for sharing that
data among system players and consumers.
It is important to emphasize, however, that even in the absence of
health finance reform it is possible to create these methods of data
collection and data sharing on a federal, regional, or state level. Leg-
islative bodies could establish a Board or Commission or appoint an
official with the responsibility to develop a health information strat-
egy, set standards, and monitor the collection, use, and transmission
85 The InformationalFrammork in the Health Security Act: Hearing on H.IR 3000 Before the
Subcomm. on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil
Serv., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Nan D. Hunter, Deputy General Counsel,
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs.). The several influential bodies that pressed the
concept of a health information infrastructure all foresaw data systems as a necessary fea-
ture of reform. HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 1-2; PPRC 1993,
supra note 10, at 27-54; PPRC 1992, supra note 10, at 263-82; WORKGROUP FOR ErEc. DATA
INTERCHANGE, supra note 30, at 1-2.
86 WHITE HOUSE DoMEsTic PoLIcY COUNCIL, supra note 56, at 123-38.
87 See DIVISION OF DATA POLICY, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COMPARISON OF
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND PRIVACY PROVISIONS IN HEALTH CARE RFORM PROPOSALS (1994)
(describing the bills); see also COMMrITEE ON NATL. STATISTICS, PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY,
AND STATISTICAL USES OF HEALTH CARE INFORMATION (1994).
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of health data throughout the system.88 A number of different types
of data could be collected: eligibility and enrollment for the govern-
ment health benefit or private insurance plans; patient encounters
with health care providers; administrative and financial transactions;
demographics; quality measurement, utilization, risk assessment, peer
review, patient satisfaction, outcomes, and access; practice patterns for
monitoring fraud and abuse; and health statistics and research re-
sults.89 These data could be collected in a standardized format, both
for administrative simplicity and to allow consistent measurements
and comparisons within a national system.90
D. Assessing the Essential Purposes of a Health Information
Infrastructure
It is not sufficient simply to present the health and financial
objectives of a health information infrastructure. It is also necessary
to measure the value of the efficient collection of information to the
health and well-being of patients, as well as the cost savings to the
health care system. Without a careful evaluation of the likely benefits
of an organized health information strategy, it is impossible to assess
whether the gains justify sacrificing a certain level of privacy.9 1
American society appears enamored with the power of informa-
tion. Governments often claim a need to know certain information to
achieve their purposes, whether it be national security, law enforce-
88 See, e.g., Health Security Act of 1994, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) [here-
inafter Health Security Act] (National Health Board is required to develop and implement
a health information system (§ 5101) in conjunction with a National Privacy and Health
Data Advisory Council (§ 5140)); Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993, S.
1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Health Reform Today Act) (Health Care
Data Panel, a federal panel chaired by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HIS),
develops the system, with regulations promulgated by the Office of Management and
Budget; the Panel is advised by a National Health Informatics Commission); Affordable
Health Care Now Act of 1993, H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (HHS Secretary
adopts standards for data elements, uniform claim forms, and uniform electronic transmis-
sion of data; the Secretary consults with the Workgroup on Electronic Data Interchange
and others and establishes an advisory commission); American Health Security Act of 1993,
H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (American Health Security Standards Board com-
prised of the HHS Secretary and others); Managed Competition Act of 1993, H.R. 3222,
103 Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Health Care Standards Commission appointed by the Presi-
dent; the Benefit, Evaluations, and Data Standards Board, a nonprofit organization, advises
the Commission); Health Care Information Modernization and Security Act of 1993, H.R.
3137, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Information system similar to Health Reform Today
Act, supra); Medical and Health Insurance Information Reform Act of 1992, S. 2878, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (HHS Secretary oversees state development of Comparative Value
Information Programs for health care purchasing).
89 See, e.g., Health Security Act, supra note 88, § 5101(e).
90 See, e.g., Health Security Act, supra note 88, § 5102(b).
91 See Allan M. Brandt et al., Routine Hospital Testing for HIV: Health Policy Considera-
tions, in AIDS AND THE H.ALTH CARE SYSTEM 125 (Lawrence 0. Gostin ed., 1990) (arguing
for this approach).
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ment, or public health;92 health care providers often claim a need to
know the full medical and behavioral history of patients, not only for
clinical decisionmaking, but also for their own occupational safety;93
and patients claim a right to know information about the benefits and
risks of treatments and the qualifications and other characteristics of
doctors in order to make informed decisions.94 It is not surprising,
therefore, to find that many advocates of a health information infra-
structure simply assume that collection of ever increasing health infor-
mation, in ever more efficient ways, is inherently a social good.9 5 This
assumption is not self-evident, however; it requires testing.
What exactly are the goals of a health information infrastructure
and how could these goals be attained?96 Overall, the goals are: (1)
to guarantee the integrity of health data so that information is accu-
rate, complete, current, and trustworthy, since the integrity of infor-
mation is critical to quality patient care, assessment of services,
research, and public health; (2) to ensure the availability of health
data so that persons who need the information for legitimate health
purposes have ready access to the data, since without readily available
clinical information, providers cannot make informed decisions re-
garding diagnoses and treatment; and (3) to allow the administrative
simplification of financial and other transactions, since burdensome
and duplicative processing of transactions can significantly drive up
the costs of providing health care.
Advocates of a health information infrastructure forecast a
number of benefits, including the ability to enhance consumer
92 See Sarah McCabe, National Security and Freedom of Information, in CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
CoLmucr 185, 185 (Larry Gostin ed., 1988) ("The acquisition, analysis, and prudent dispo-
sition of knowledge sometimes is and always should be the prime objective of every individ-
ual and of every state. . . . In [the government's] restricted sense of 'information,'
however, it is clearly seen as a powerful instrument of control over destructive forces within
and without state boundaries.").
93 For example, many clinicians claim the right to know if their patients are infected
with the human immunodeficiency virus; in certain circumstances, such as following a nee-
die stick accident, several state statutes grant them a right to know. SeeLarry Gostin, Hospi-
tals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionals
and Patients, 48 MD. L. REv. 12 (1989); Larry 0. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Con-
fronting AIDS: Legislative and Regulatoy Policy in the United States, 261 JAMA 1621 (1989)
(listing state statutes); see also David M. Bell, HIV Infection in Health Care Workers: Occupa-
tional Risk and Prevention, in AIDS AND THE HEALTH CARE SYsTEM 115 (Lawrence 0. Gostin
ed., 1990).
94 See Larry Gostin, The Hi-Infected Health Care ProfessionaL Public Policy, Discrimina-
tion, and Patient Safety, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 303 (1990).
95 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS., HEALTH REcoRDS: SocLA
NEEDs AND PERSONAL PRIVACy (1993) (proceedings of a conference sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C., Feb. 11-12, 1993).
96 See INsTrrUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 25 (describing the advantages of computer-
based patient records (CPRs) and proposing a plan for systemwide development of CPRs);
HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8.
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choice, improve the quality of health services, assess system perform-
ance, improve administrative efficiency, facilitate research, and safe-
guard public health.97
1. Enhancing Consumer Choice
Proponents of managed competition, a variation of which formed
the core of President Clinton's health care plan, 98 have long regarded
high quality information as an essential element of an efficient health
care market.99 Of course, informing and protecting consumers
"ought to be a valued end in itself, not just a means to a working
health care marketplace."100 Under almost any health care system,
consumers have to make a number of important decisions. Consum-
ers have to choose a health plan and a primary care provider. More-
over, they must make numerous decisions about health services such
as which specialist or hospital best meets their needs. At present, con-
sumers can rarely base their decisions about health services upon
clear and relevant information.
Most importantly, under classic managed competition theory,
consumers in the present system cannot realistically make informed
choices about health care or insurance plans. These plans have a
numbing variety of benefits, services, and prices that make it virtually
impossible for the average consumer to make intelligent comparisons.
For example, if a dozen health plans exist in a given market, with each
plan publishing a detailed prospectus of covered conditions, exclu-
sions, capitations, and preexisting conditions in a nonuniform format,
even the most studious consumers will have difficulty making an in-
formed choice. By requiring all health plans to provide the same core
benefits package, proponents of managed competition expect that
consumers would be able to make choices based on the quality and
price of services; and they expect that health plans would compete on
quality and price as a result. The problem with this approach is that
97 See PPRC 1994, supra note 10, at 311-12 (listing, in addition to the benefits listed in
1993, the ability to reduce administrative complexity and expenses); PPRC 1993, supra
note 10, at 33-37 (listing the ability to monitor utilization, costs, and quality of care; to hold
providers accountable for quality and access; to support outcomes research and profiling;
and to measure risk); PPRC 1992, supra note 10, at 263 (listing four objectives of data
improvement: administrative efficiency in payment, monitoring the provision and cost of
services, profiling, and effectiveness research).
98 See generally Paul Starr, The Framework of Health Care Reform, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1666 (1993) (discussing President Clinton's Health Security plan).
99 See Alaln C. Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan: A National-Health-Insurance Pro-
posal Based on Regulated Competition in the Private Sector, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 709 (1978);
Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, HE.LTH A., 1993
Supp. at 24; see also OTA INFORMATiON FOR CONSumERs, supra note 6, at 1 (listing three
rationales for the call for more public information).
100 Shoshanna Sofaer, Informing and Protecting Consumers Under Managed Competition,
HE.ATH A., 1993 Supp., at 76.
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even if a standard benefits package provides consumers with the op-
portunity to make judgments on the basis of quality, they still lack the
information needed to actually assess the quality of health services.
Consumers are seldom provided with adequate indicators of the qual-
ity of services provided by health plans, hospitals, or health care
professionals. 101
Thus, an effective quality management program must gather bet-
ter information on quality and must provide consumers with that in-
formation in standardized form. A core set of quality and
performance measures would assist consumers in making informed
health choices. Such information could be provided in annual re-
ports assessing the available health plans according to a series of qual-
ity measures, including: (1) access to care (e.g., waiting times to see
primary care practitioners and specialists); (2) appropriateness of care
(e.g., measured against regional practices or practice guidelines); (3)
health outcomes (e.g., percentage of low birth weight infants, nursing
home or hospital patients with bedsores, or mortality after a heart at-
tack or stroke); (4) health promotion (e.g., education programs pro-
vided such as smoking cessation or stress management classes); (5)
disease prevention (e.g., rates for vaccinations, mammograms, prena-
tal care or HIV screening); and (6) overall satisfaction with care (e.g.,
percentage of enrollees satisfied with the plan or satisfied with their
primary care physician, percentage of enrollees leaving the plan, and
the number of complaints filed). Such a program would make it pos-
sible for consumers to choose health plans and providers based on
standardized performance and satisfaction measures.102
101 Even under the existing system, some attempt has been made to provide consum-
ers with information about the quality of services. From 1986 to 1993, the Health Care
Financing Administration published annual data comparing the mortality experience of
hospitals. See, e.g., HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, MEDICARE HOsPrrAL MORTAL.
rny INFORMAION, 1990 (1991). See OTA INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS, supra note 6, at 5.
Several states (e.g., California, New York, and Pennsylvania) and voluntary organizations
(e.g., the Greater Cleveland Health Quality Choice Project) have published comparative
outcome data on health care institutions and professionals. See, e.g., CAIFORNIA OFFICE OF
STATEWIDE HEALTH PLANNING & DEv., HEALTH DATA CATALOG (June 1991); CLFvELAND
HI.ALTH QUALITY CHOIcE, SUMMARY REPORT (1993) (summarizing for the public informa-
tion from THE CLEVELANi-AREA HosPrrAL QUALIT OUTCOME MEASUREMENTS AND PATIENT
SATISFACrION REPORT (1993)); PENNSYLvANIA HEALTH CARE COsT CONTAINMENr COUNCIL, A
CONSUMER GUmE TO CORONARY ARTERY BYPASS GRAFr SURGERY (1992); see also HEALTH
DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 96.98; Timothy S.Jost, Health System Refom
Forward or Backward with Quality Oversight?, 271 JAMA 1508, 1508.09 (1994); Charles
Marwick, Using High-Quality Providers to Cope with Today's Rising Health Care Costs, 268 JAMA
2142 (1992).
102 See Edward L. Baker et al., Health Reform and the Health of the Public Forging Commu-
nity Health Partnerships, 272JAMA 1276, 1280 (1994) (describing the Health Plan Employer
Data and Information Set developed by the National Committee for Quality Assurance, a
nonprofit accrediting body for managed care organizations, to produce "report cards" for
consumers); THE WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POL'Y COUNCIL, supra note 56, at 111-35.
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In the present system, it is virtually impossible to obtain this type
of information: there are no requirements for health plans or institu-
tions to maintain data on quality, no standards for uniform data sets
to render rational comparisons possible, and no strategies for elec-
tronic collection and presentation of these data to consumers. A na-
tional information infrastructure could provide consumers with a
much broader and more comprehensible range of information, and
thus allow them to make more informed choices about health
services.
It is reasonable to assume that these innovations would substan-
tially enhance the autonomy and decisionmaking capacity of consum-
ers in the health care system, and that consumer choice would then
have some positive effect on quality.105 Quality assessment is, of
course, far more complicated than a "report card" can reflect.104 A
poor outcome measure is not always an indicator of inferior quality; it
may just reveal differences in the population of enrollees for the plan.
Health plans with low income, sicker populations may score low on
performance measures even if they provide high quality services.
Moreover, health plans may score relatively well on measures of per-
formance that are included in the report card, but do relatively poorly
in areas not included. Plans might "game" the system by channeling
resources to measured indicators, while ignoring quality problems in
other areas. The result would be high marks on the report card, but
otherwise inferior quality services. 10 5
Some commentators argue that streamlining the existing regula-
tory system for overseeing the quality of health services' 06 and relying
instead on the empowerment of consumers will harm quality rather
than enhance it. 107 They suggest that, regardless of the information
provided, consumers are ill-equipped to make reasoned judgments
103 See generally Douglas Sharrott, Provider-Specic Quality-of-Care Data: A ProposalforLim-
ited Mandatory Disclosure 58 BROoK. L R v. 85 (1992).
104 SeeJesse Green, Problems in the Use of Outcome Statistics to Compare Health Care Provid-
ers, 58 BRooK L. REv. 55 (1992).
105 Gostin, supra note 1, at 8.
106 Under the Health Security Act, supra note 88, the National Quality Management
Program would develop uniform standards for licensing health care institutions that focus
on essential performance requirements. However, the Medicare Peer Review Organization
would end once the Secretary of Health and Human Services determined that Medicare
enrollees were adequately protected through the National Quality Management Program.
In addition, the administrative requirements under the Clinical Laboratory Improvements
Act would be reduced. See WHrrE HousE DOMESTmc Pouc CouNcIL., supra note 56, at 118-
22; see also Timothy S. Jost, Administrative Law Issues Involving the Medicare Utilization and
Quality Control Review Organization (PRO) Program: Analysis and Recommendations, 50 OHIO
ST. LJ. 1, 51-53 (1989).
107 Jost, supra note 106.
[Vol. 80:451
HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY
about health services. 108 However, although misleading claims of
quality and performance often limit rational market decisions, con-
sumers in the health care market can, and should, play the most effec-
tive role possible in influencing the price and quality of services.
Considerable empirical scholarship is emerging on the value of pub-
licly disclosing information to consumers.10 9 Although the value of
such disclosure is dependant on the reliability, validity, fairness, and
comprehensibility of the data, thoughtful strategies have been sug-
gested to improve the quality of consumer information, meeting many
of the objections of critics." 0
Providing accurate information to consumers that facilitates logi-
cal comparisons among plans and providers would result in several
broad benefits. First, arming consumers with the most reliable infor-
mation has intrinsic value in enhancing autonomy and a sense of
shared participation in the health services market. Just as the prevail-
ing legal and ethical thought consistently promotes autonomous deci-
sions by patients regarding their treatment,"' so should consumers be
encouraged to make choices about their health plans and provid-
ers." 2 Second, public disclosure of information promotes health edu-
cation. It enables consumers to have a more sophisticated
understanding of the health care system as a whole, as well as the costs
and quality of individual services. It may also improve understanding
of the relationship between personal behavior and health out-
108 See, e.g., Timothy S.Jost, The Necessay and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the Qual-
ity of Health Care, 25 Hous. L REv. 525, 560.64 (1988) (making this argument); see also Dent
v. WestVirginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1889) ("Every one may have occasion to consult [the
physician], but comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill
which he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the assurance given by his license,
issued by an authority competent to judge in that respect, that he possesses the requisite
qualifications.").
109 See HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 91-129; OTA INFoRMA-
TION FOR CONSUMERS, supra note 6, at 23.
110 The OTA made the following recommendations for disseminating information to
consumers: stimulate consumer awareness of quality of care; provide easily understood in-
formation; present information in more than one format; use reputable organizations to
interpret quality-of-care information; make information accessible; and provide consumers
with the skills to use, and physicians the skills to provide, information on quality of care.
OTA INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS, supra note 6, at 40-47.
111 See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin & Robert F. Weir, Life and Death Choices After
Cruzan: Case Law and Standards of Professional Conduct, 69 MuAmNK Q. 143 (1991) (explor-
ing the law, ethics, and professional standards regarding patients' autonomous decision-
making).
112 Arguably, macro decisions about which plan or hospital to choose have a greater
impact on the health of the person than micro decisions about which treatment to choose.
Furthermore, arguments about the ability of competent patients to understand treatment
options have not caused courts or commentators to abandon the principle of autonomous
decisionmaking in the context of treatment decisions. Nor should legal or ethical analysis
accept the assertion that consumers simply lack the sufficient sophistication to understand
the complexities of the provision of health services. See Sharrot, supra note 103, at 85-88.
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comes." 3 Finally, while managed competition theorists may have
overstated their claim that informed consumers will influence the
market to provide more cost-effective services, it is likely that provid-
ing consumers with reliable and relevant information will ultimately
have a positive effect on the market for health services." 4
2. Improving the Quality of Health Services
Empowering consumers to make more informed choices, if it is
to be effective in improving quality, must be undertaken in conjunc-
tion with several other strategies." 5 These strategies include the set-
ting of minimum standards, the development of practice guidelines,
the monitoring of provider performance, and the provision of relia-
ble, complete, and timely information to regulators, health plans, in-
stitutions, and health care professionals. A health information
infrastructure could increase the effectiveness of each of these strate-
gies for enhancing the quality of health services.
A helpful way of assessing the benefits of a health information
infrastructure is to imagine how data, now largely unavailable, could
help participants in the health care system improve the quality of pa-
tient services. Health care professionals rarely have access to full in-
formation about their patients, including their behavioral and clinical
history, immunizations, screenings (e.g., mammogram, pap smear,
PPD skin test, or HIV antibody test), allergies to medications, diagnos-
tic tests, and treatments." 6 The lack of accurate, comprehensive, and
accessible information makes it more difficult, time consuming, and
costly to provide a full range of health services to patients. A comput-
erized patient record would enable health care providers to furnish
clinical prevention services such as outreach (e.g., tracking children
113 The Institute of Medicine concluded that
the public interest is materially served when society is given as much infor-
mation on costs, quality, and value for health care dollar expended as can
be given accurately and provided with educational materials that aid inter-
pretation of that information. Indeed, public disclosure and public educa-
tion go hand-in-hand.
HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 95.
114 Many observers believe that one of the principal effects of a health care reform that
limits price increases, disallows preexisting condition clauses, and prohibits risk selection
will be that competition on the basis of quality of services will become more prominent.
HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 73; A~mucAN MEDICAL PEER RE-
VIEW ASS'N, MANAGED COMPETITION AND THE ROLE OF QUAIrTY OVERSIGHT (1993).
115 OTA INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS, supra note 6, at 28 ("[I]nforming consumers
and relying on their subsequent actions should not be viewed as the only method to en-
courage hospitals and physicians to maintain and improve the quality of their care. Even
well-informed lay-people... must continue to rely on experts to ensure the quality of
providers."); see also Alan L Hilman et al., Safeguarding Quality in Managed Competition,
HEALTH Ars., 1993 Supp., at 110.
116 For a discussion of the inadequacy and duplication of manual records, see supra
notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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who have not been immunized) or health promotion (e.g., providing
HIV risk prevention for intravenous drug users) far more
efficiently." 7
Computerized records could increase the effectiveness of preven-
tion programs that cannot be conducted without complete informa-
tion about screening, vaccinations, risk profiles, or other essential
data. Computers can also issue reminders to clinicians to perform in-
dicated medical tests. Access to a full patient record is equally valua-
ble in emergency situations or in the management of complex cases.
Databases that include prescriptions and sales of pharmaceuticals
could help pharmacists and primary care providers to track their
proper use among elderly patients or report adverse drug reactions.
Genetic databases with complete personal and family histories may be-
come vital for testing, counselling, and treatment of persons with ge-
netic traits, predispositions, or disease.' 1 8
Effective clinical decisionmaking for health care professionals is
influenced not only by the information available about the patient
and his or her family, but also the information that is available to assist
in the diagnosis and treatment of disease." 9 Health care profession-
als know surprisingly little about the health outcomes of a large
number of standard medical interventions. 120 Frequently, this results
from an insufficient amount of research or a lack of scientific consen-
sus about the cost effectiveness of treatments. However, it can also
result from practitioners' lack of information. Automated informa-
tion systems could assist in a number of ways to obtain and dissemi-
nate this information to health care professionals. With data from
large populations more accessible, outcomes research could better an-
117 For example, approximately two fifths of two-year-old children in the United States
have not received recommended immunizations on schedule. Gary L Freed & Samuel L.
Katz, The Comprehensive Childhood Immunization Act of 1993: Toward a More Rational Approach,
329 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1957 (1993). Some observers think a national or statewide tracking
and reminder system (eliminated from President Clinton's childhood immunization initia-
tive) would be an effective strategy for increasing the rate of childhood vaccination. Id.; see
also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
118 See generaly George Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded Future
Diaries, 270JAMA 2346 (1993) (discussing the efficiency of patient databases and privacy
issues); Andrea de Gorgey, Note, The Advent of DNA Databanks: Implications for Informational
Privacy, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 381 (1990) (discussing possibility of accumulating a massive
genetic databank and the privacy concerns that might result from such an undertaking).
119 See generaly RichardJ. Johns & Nicholas J. Fortuin, Clinical Information and Clinical
Problem Solving, in THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 1 (A. McGehee Harvey et al.
eds., 22d ed. 1988); RichardJ. Johns et al., The Collection and Evaluation of Clinical Informa-
tion, in id. at 4.
120 See HENRv J. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION: FINANCING AMERICA'S
HEALTH CARE 15-16 (1991); David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncer-
tainty, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 74; M. Gregg Bloche, Managed Care: A Second Opin-
ion, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1992, at 17.
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swer important clinical questions;121 with more easily analyzed data
collections, policy makers could more effectively develop minimum
standards or practice guidelines;122 and with user-friendly decision
trees available in health care offices and institutions, health care pro-
fessionals could receive immediate assistance in making complex
clinical decisions.
3. Assessing System Performance
If the health care system exists to achieve fundamental social
goods for the nation, then what are the goods that we wish to achieve,
and how can they be measured? The primary goals of the health care
system, often stated, are access to services, equitable distribution of
services, and cost effectiveness (i.e., ensuring high quality services at a
reasonable cost). A health information infrastructure could help the
government accurately assess planning, performance, and delivery to
determine if these objectives are being achieved.
Persistent and sometimes substantial differences exist in the avail-
ability and quality of health care in the United States. 23 Differences
occur between the uninsured and the insured, 24 the poor and the
rich,12 5 those in public (e.g., Medicaid) and private programs, 26 mi-
121 See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
122 The National Quality Management Program proposed by the Clinton Administra-
tion would develop practice guidelines to assist providers in achieving quality standards
and underpin national measures of quality, develop methodology standards for practice
guidelines, operate a clearinghouse and dissemination program for guidelines, and dis-
seminate information documenting clinically ineffective procedures and treatments.
WHITE HOUsE DoMESTc PoLIcv CouNcIt., supra note 56, at 118; see also INsTIruTE OF
MEDICINE, GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE: FROM DEVELOPMENT TO UsE (Marilyn J.
Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1992). The actual utility of practice guidelines to improve
clinical decisionmaking, however, is the subject of considerable disagreement. SeeBloche,
supra note 120.
123 See generally INsTrrumE OF MEDICINE, AccEss TO HEALTH CARE IN AmrucA (Michael
Millman ed., 1993) (examining the relationship between access to health care and factors
such as income, race, clinic origin, and location).
124 See Paula Braveman et al., Adverse Outcomes and Lack of Health Insurance Among
Newborns in an Eight-County Area of California, 1982-1986, 321 NEw ENG.J. MED. 508 (1989);
JeffreyJ. Stoddard et al., Health Insurance Status and Ambulatoy Care for Children, 330 Naw
ENG.J. MED. 1421 (1994) (uninsured children are more likely than children with insurance
to receive no care from physicians for specified conditions).
125 See John Z. Ayanian, Race, Class, and the Quality of Medical Care, 271 JAMA 1027
(1994); Katherine L. Kahn et al., Health Care for Black and Poor Hospitalized Medicare Patients,
271 JAMA 1169 (1994); Paul H. Wise et al., Racial and Socioeconomic Disparities in Childhood
Mortality in Boston, 313 NEw ENG.J. MED. 360 (1985).
126 See Mark B. Wenneker et al., The Association of Payer With Utilization of Cardiac Proce-
dure in Massachusetts, 264JAMA 125 (1990).
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nority and white populations, 2 7 men and women,128 and those in ru-
ral and urban areas.'2 9 The best extant research. in evaluating
differential access to health services has relied on government and
other databases. National or regional information systems are essen-
tial for the purposes of tracking the use (or under use) of services
among traditionally under-served populations (e.g., impoverished
children and adults, pregnant women, racial minorities, and persons
with disabilities), evaluating the reasons for unequal access, and gen-
erally planning and administering a complex population-based health
system.'3 0
A health information infrastructure could provide similar bene-
fits for tracking the cost of services. Although we know much about
escalating health care costs in the United States relative to health ex-
penditures in other countries,13' we know little about where the great-
est costs occur in the system or the reasons for the high costs. This
hinders the development of effective methods of reducing the costs.
A comprehensive electronic system that tracks expenditures on the
basis of variables such as geographic region, health plan or insurer,
health care provider, and forms of treatment, and compares these
127 SeeJohn Z. Ayanian, Heart Disease in Black and White, 329 NEw ENG. J. ME. 656
(1993); Lance B. Becker et al., Racial Differences in the Incidence of Cardiac Arrest and Subse-
quent Surviva, 329 NEw ENG. J. Mn. 600 (1993); Council on Ethical &Judicial Affairs,
Black-MhitDisparities in Health Car, 263JAMA 2344 (1990); Eric D. Peterson et al., Racial
Variation in Cardiac Procedure Use and Survival Following Acute Myocardial Infarction in the De-
partment of Veterans Affairs, 271 JAMA 1175 (1994);Jeff Whittle et al., Good & Lofgren, Racial
Differences in the Use of Invasive Cardiovascular Procedures in the Department of Veterans Affairs
Medical System, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 621 (1993); see also Vernellia R. Randall, Racist Health
Care: Reforming an Unjust Health Care System to Meet the Needs of African Americans, 3 HEA.TH
MATRxX 127 (1993).
128 SeeJohn Z. Ayanian & Arnold M. Epstein, Dfferences in the Use of Procedures Between
Men and Women Hospitalized for Coronary Health Disease, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 221, 223-25
(1991).
129 See Mark Chassin, Explaining Geographic Variations: The Enthusiasm Hypotheses, 31
MED. Coa YS37-44 (1993); Mark Chassin et al., Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical
Services by the Medicare Population, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 285 (1986).
130 H.ALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 69-70. The Institute points
out, however, that insurers could potentially use information about utilization to devise
insurance packages attractive to, or affordable by, only those groups with low utilization
patterns. Id. at 70.
1S1 The United States spent more than $666 billion on health care in 1990, approxi-
mately 12% of the nation's gross national product. Health care expenditures are projected
to reach $1.6 trillion, between 16% and 18% of the gross domestic product, by the end of
the decade if effective controls are not instituted. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFmcE, PRO-
JECTIONS OF NATIONAL HELTH EXPENDITURES 14 tbl.1 (Oct. 1992); Timothy S.Jost & San-
draJ. Tanenbaum, Selling Cost Containmen 19 AM.J.L. & MED. 95, 96-97 (1993); GeorgeJ.
Scheiber et al., Health Care Systems in Twenty-Four Nations, HEALTH ArF., Fall 1991, at 22, 24;
Sally T. Sonnenfeld et al., Projection of National Health Expenditures Through the Year 2000,
HEALTH CARE FIN. RaV., Fall 1991, at 1, 4, 22; Louis W. Sullivan, The Bush Administrations
Health Care Plan, 327 NEw ENG.J. Mn. 801, 801 (1992).
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data with health outcomes could constructively assess the cost-effec-
tiveness of services in the system.
An effective health care information infrastructure, then, has
considerable potential to assist in measuring system performance in
critical areas such as access, equity, and cost. By accurately measuring
the success of the system on these and other parameters, a sound in-
formation infrastructure ought to improve policy making, resource al-
location, and strategic planning. As policy and practice adjustments
are made in the health care system, they can also be measured against
the same criteria. With on-going assessment based on standardized
measures of success, it should be possible to achieve continuous im-
provement in each of the critical areas of the health care system.'32
4. Improving Administrative Efficiency
One of the most persistent criticisms of the health care system is
its costly and inefficient bureaucracy. 33 This is partly caused by the
extensive array of uncoordinated private and public sources of financ-
ing. Processing of claims for reimbursement by an extensive number
of third-party payers, each with its own paper forms and bureaucratic
requirements, is burdensome and costly. Approximately nineteen to
twenty-four percent of health care expenditures is spent on adminis-
trative expenses, and a substantial proportion of these administrative
expenditures are consumed by claims processing.134 Moreover, the
myriad number of paper forms, copayment, and deductibility require-
ments are confusing for consumers and time consuming for health
care providers.
A health information infrastructure could reduce many of these
paperwork burdens by creating databases containing enrollment, fi-
nancial, and utilization data, based on uniform electronic records of
encounters with health care providers and payment claims.' 3 5 Experi-
ence with existing electronic systems used by health insurers shows
that automation significantly increases the efficiency of billing, reim-
bursement, claims tracking, remittance reconciliation, and similar
132 See Donald M. Berwick, Continuous Improvement as Ideal in Health Carm 320 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 53 (1989); Avedis Donabedian, The Quality of Care: How Can It Be Assessed?, 260
JAMA 1743 (1988).
133 The findings included in the Health Security Act assert that "an excessive burden
of forms, paperwork, and bureaucratic procedures confuses consumers and overwhelms
health care providers" and that "administrative burdens should be reduced." Health Se-
curity Act, supra note 88, § 2 (1) (C), (E).
134 Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, The Deteriorating Administrative Effi-
ciency of the U.S. Health Care System, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1253, 1255-56 (1991). The net
costs of private health insurance consumed 14.2% of premiums collected. Katherine R.
Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 1990, HEALTH CARE FIN. REv., Fall 1991, at 36-37;
see alsoJost & Tanenbaum, supra note 131, 98, 115.
135 WHITE HOUSE DoMESTIC POLICv COUNCIL, supra note 56, at 128-30.
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business procedures. 3 6 It is estimated that the use of electronic data
interchange on a system-wide level could create substantial economic
savings while reducing time consuming paperwork burdens on health
care providers.' 37 Studies have demonstrated similar savings by intro-
duction of microcomputer workstations for physicians.'3 8 Automation
could also reduce fraud and abuse by carefully tracking providers' re-
imbursement claims and matching those claims with electronic treat-
ment records.'3 9
5. Facilitating Research
If the quality of services and the health of patients and popula-
tions are the touchstones of a health care system, then research on the
determinants, prevalence, prevention, and treatment of injury and
disease deserves preeminent attention. 40 Research in the United
States is wide-ranging and includes the investigation of clinical deci-
sions made by health care professionals, health services or patterns of
practice, behavior or behavior change of individuals and populations,
and the distribution and determination of health-related states or
events in specified populations.' 41
A health information infrastructure could improve research in a
number of ways: it could make research less expensive by reducing
the costs of collecting and analyzing secondary data, more trustworthy
because of the accuracy of the data, and more generalizable to all
segments of the population' 42 because of the completeness of the
data. Much of the best health related research uses information that
is already collected, and does not involve the prospective gathering of
136 HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 76.
137 WORKGROUP FOR ELEC'RONIC DATA INTERCHANGE, supra note 30, at 3.
138 William M. Tierney, et al., Physician Inpatient Order Writing on Microcomputer Worksta-
tions: Effects on Resource Utilization, 269JAMA 379, 381-82 (1993) (A network of microcom-
puter workstations for writing all inpatient orders lowered one hospital's patient charges
and hospital costs by an estimated three million dollars and could potentially save tens of
billions of dollars nationwide.).
139 See OTA FEDERAL GovFRNmEwr TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 37-66 (utilizing com-
puter matching to detect fraud, waste, and abuse). The Health Security Act would estab-
lish a health care fraud and abuse enforcement program with strengthened controls and
penalties as well as antifraud standards for electronic media claims. Health Security Act,
supra note 88, tit. V(E).
140 See generally William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to Evalu-
ate and Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEv ENG.J. MED. 1197 (1988) (discussing the benefits
of having information on health outcomes).
141 See generallyJohn M. Last, Epidemiology and Ethics, 19 LAwN, MED. & HEALTHCAE 166
(1991) (describing the scope and methodology of epidemiology).
142 More complete data would include, for example, more information about women.
See Venessa Merton, The Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable and Once-Pregnable People (aka Wo-
men) ftom Biomedical Research, 19 AM.J.L. & MED. 369 (1993).
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primary data.'43 These retrospective studies, while they do not use
controls or randomization, often involve rigorous design and statisti-
cal methods. An expanded health care database would significantly
facilitate this important form of research.
A health information infrastructure could also contribute to clas-
sic randomized, controlled trials, particularly large-scale clinical trials
that study the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals and vaccines. For
example, it could help determine the incidence or pattern of disease
or treatment in the population and assist in designing a sampling
frame for the study.' 44 In sum, a health information infrastructure
could provide significant benefits for clinical, health services, behav-
ioral, and epidemiological research. Improving the quantity and qual-
ity of research would increase our ability to provide cost-effective
interventions for the prevention and treatment of injury and disease.
6. Safeguarding the Public Health
While clinical medicine is focused primarily on the individual pa-
tient and the treatment of disease, the focus of public health is on the
vitality of the community and prevention of disease. 14 It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that one of the strongest demands for an expanded
health care database comes from those concerned with public health
(e.g., the U.S. Public Health Service, state and municipal health de-
partments, community-based organizations, epidemiologists, biostatis-
ticians, and academic schools of hygiene and public health). 46
There is considerable utility in using population-based data to
promote the health of the community. These data can help track the
incidence, patterns, and trends of injury and disease in popula-
143 HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 72-73 (citing Fleming et al.,
A Decision Analysis of Altemative Treatment Strategies for Clinically Localized Prostate Cancer, 269
JAMA 2650 (1993) and Grace L Lu-Yao et al., An Assessment of Radical Prostatectomy: Time
Trends, Geographic Variation, and Outcomes, 269JAMA 2633 (1993)).
144 HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 72-73.
145 The public health care system, of course, does play an important role in the treat-
ment of individual patients by providing patient-centered clinical prevention services such
as pap smears, mammograms, colerectal screening, and vaccinations.
146 See INsTrruTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH App. A (1988); Baker et
al., supra note 62, at 1281 ("[T]he CDC is vigorously promoting electronic information
sharing between state public health agencies and itself, and it is also seeking to stimulate
similar connectivity among public health partners within states."); Andrew Friede et al.,
CDC Warden: A Comprehensive On-Line Public Health Information System of the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, 83 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 1289 (1993) (describing CDC mechanism for
placing information in the hands of health care professions).
Government at all levels may have a keen interest in these data. While this discussion
focuses primarily on health departments, it is conceivable that the information would be
used for health-related purposes by other parts of government, such as those responsible
for social services, child protection, welfare, housing, and nutrition.
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tions.147 Carefully planned surveillance or epidemiological activities
facilitate rapid identification of health needs, including the spread of
communicable or sexually transmitted infection or disease (e.g., HIV,
TB, hepatitis B virus, or herpes simplex), clusters or outbreaks of bac-
terial or viral infection (e.g., Legionnaire's disease, hanta virus, or E.
Coil), the initiation of risk behaviors in sub-populations (e.g., smoking
among female adolescents or ethnic minorities), and patterns of harm
(e.g., child or spousal abuse, lead poisoning, radon, iatrogenic inju-
ries, or gunshot wounds). Tracking of health risks allows those con-
cerned with public health to concentrate resources and focus
interventions in areas of greatest need. Well targeted prevention pro-
grams such as health education and promotion, testing and counsel-
ing, treatment, and contact tracking are highly cost effective. 48
Health departments do not have the capacity (in terms of labora-
tories, surveillance, outreach programs, and information systems) to
identify and effectively respond to the great variety of health risks fac-
ing populations.1 49 Surprisingly, health departments have relatively
few tools to gather the information about health threats in a timely
manner: they do not have the resources to routinely screen for most
diseases; many diseases are not reportable or are under reported; and
surveillance and epidemiologic research are usually narrowly focused
on specific diseases or geographic areas.'5 0
Many public health functions are the joint responsibility of the
personal health care system and the public health system. Accord-
ingly, reliable information needs to be shared across these two health
systems. For example, prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of drug
and alcohol dependency, sexually transmitted diseases, AIDS, and tu-
berculosis are undertaken both by health care providers and health
departments. Similarly, registries containing information about im-
munizations, traumas, and cancers may provide substantial advantages
to health care providers and health departments in understanding the
determinants of disease (environmental, occupational, or genetic)
and outcomes following interventions. Databases containing informa-
tion about blood types, organs, and tissues could improve the safety,
147 See, e.g., 3 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTRO., NATIONAL HIV SEROSURVEI.ANCE SUM-
mARY. RESULTS THROUGH 1992, at 4-5 (1994) (reporting results of HIV prevalence in ado-
lescents, women, adults at high risk for acquiring HIV, and minority populations).
148 SeeJoycelyn Elders, The Future of U.S. Public Health, 269 JAMA 2293 (1993) (each
dollar spent on prevention saves several dollars in personal medical services).
149 See INSrrUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 146, at 19-34; Eugene Feingold, Health Care
Reform-More Than Cost Containment and Universal Access, 84 AM. J.L. & PUB. HEALTH 727,
727-28 (1994); see also WHITE HOUSE DoMEsTIc PoUcy COUNCIL, supra note 56, at 161-69
(public health initiatives).
150 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J.L & MED. 461
(1986).
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efficacy, and efficiency of the blood supply, organ procurement, and
transplantation. 151
Consider, as an illustration, the role of health information in the
case of tuberculosis control. 52 Persons with mulfidrug-resistant tu-
berculosis frequently come into contact with a wide variety of agencies
and organizations, each of which may be unaware that the person is
infectious or may not be taking prescribed antituberculosis drugs.
Persons with tuberculosis often make multiple appearances in emer-
gency rooms (sometimes under assumed names and at different hos-
pitals); come in and out of jails, prisons, and community corrections
(on parole or probation); attend clinics for methadone maintenance
or other drug treatment; are temporarily resident in a homeless shel-
ter; and receive diagnostic and treatment services in sexually transmit-
ted disease or HIV clinics. 153 Yet, none of these entities may have
ready access to information in the personal health record or tubercu-
losis registry held by the state public health department. As a result,
these individuals, who are under the jurisdiction of health, social serv-
ices, or corrections authorities, are often not identified and are at con-
siderable risk of spreading the infection in the community or in
congregate settings. If the health record or tuberculosis registry were
readily available, the spread of the disease could be sharply curtailed.
Personal health services, it must be emphasized, are only a small
subset of the range of interventions that contribute to a healthy popu-
lation. Tracking disease and injury in the population and providing
well-targeted prevention services can reduce overall morbidity and
mortality in the community more effectively and inexpensively than
technologically advanced medical services. By providing public health
access to comprehensive data on injuries and diseases within broad
populations, society can achieve remarkable benefits for the vitality of
the community. 5 4
151 HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATIoN AGE, supra note 8, at 79-81; see also Martin Benja-
min et al., What Transplantation Can Teach Us About Health Care Reform, 330 NEv ENG. J.
MED. 858 (1994).
152 See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Resuwgent Tuberculosis Epidemic in the Era of
AIDS: Reflections on Public Health, Law, and Society, 54 MD. L. REv. 1 (1995).
15s See Centers for Disease Control, Tuberculosis Prevention in Drug-Treatment Centers and
Correctional Facilities-Selected U.S. Sites, 1990-1991, 42 MoRBIDrIY & MORTALrIy WKLY REP.
210 (1993); Centers for Disease Control, Transmission of Multi-Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis
Among Immunocampromised Persons, Correctional System-New York 1991, 41 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TAny WL.Y REP. 507 (1992); Peter A. Selwyn et al., A Prospective Study of Tuberculosis Among
Intravenous Drug Users with HIVInfection, 320 NEw ENG.J. MED. 545 (1989); Dixie E. Snider
& Mary D. Hutton, Tuberculosis in Correctional Institutions, 261 JAMA 436 (1989).
154 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SEiVs., HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000: NA-
TIONAL HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION OBJECTIvES (1991) (setting health
promotion and disease prevention goals for the United States to achieve by the year 2000,
and arguing that prevention is a cost-effective strategy for the nation); Lawrence 0. Gostin,
Securing Health orJust Health Care? The Effect of Health Care Reform on the Health of America, 39
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II
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY WITHIN A HEALTH INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
The vision of a comprehensive health information system de-
scribed in the previous Part of this Article is technologically feasible,
and a well-functioning system of this kind would be likely to achieve
significant societal benefits. However, in order to decide whether to
build a health information system, it is necessary to measure the prob-
able effects of that system on the privacy of individuals and popula-
tions. The diminution in privacy entailed in a comprehensive health
information system depends on the number of individuals and organi-
zations that would have access to the data, the sensitive nature of the
data to which they would have access, and the enhancing power of
automation as a means both to protect and to attack the privacy of
patients.
A. The Proliferation of Authorized and Unauthorized Users of
Health Data
In order to understand the proliferation of possible users, it is
helpful to identify the potential customers for health information. If
an entity can demonstrate the social or financial worth of health infor-
mation, it can probably make a strong claim for access to that informa-
tion. Potential customers are those who find health information
valuable for any number of purposes, ranging from core functions
such as clinical decisionmaking, cost containment, quality assessment,
and research, to more tangential functions such as employment, in-
surance, and commerce.
Advocates have long recognized that the most serious threats to
privacy come from authorized users of health information. 155 Provid-
ing a reasonable measure of privacy for the individual requires, at the
very least, some control over the number of individuals that have ac-
cess to health information. Once large numbers of individuals and
organizations have access to sensitive and often highly valuable infor-
mation, it becomes difficult to prevent uses that stigmatize or harm
the subjects of those data.
The Institute of Medicine found that the number of authorized
users of the computer-based patient record is too exhaustive to list,
and would parallel the complete list of the individuals and organiza-
tions associated directly or indirectly with health care: "Patient record
ST. Louis U. L REv. 7 (1995) (arguing that improving the health of the community should
be the overriding goal of the health care system).
155 See, e.g., WORK GROUP ON COMPUTERIZATION OF PATIENT RECORDS, supra note 9,
App. D.
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users provide, manage, review, or reimburse patient care services; con-
duct clinical or health services research; educate health care profes-
sionals or patients; develop or regulate health care technologies;
accredit health care professionals or provider institutions; and make
health care policy decisions."156 The Institute cataloged thirty-three
representative individual users of patient records, and thirty-four rep-
resentative institutional users.' 57 Health information users are not
limited to those with primary justifications such as health care deliv-
ery, patient management, and financial reimbursement. Secondary
uses of patient records include education (e.g., conferences, teaching
hospitals, and continuing education), regulation (e.g., litigation,
postmarketing surveillance, and accreditation), commercialization
(e.g., development of biotechnologies and marketing strategies), so-
cial services and child protection (e.g., tracking and intervening in
spousal or child abuse), and public health (e.g., disease reporting,
partner notification, and surveillance).158
Since virtually all of the various plans for a health information
infrastructure assert a broad range of compelling health objectives, 159
it is likely that Congress or the appropriate regulatory agencies would
authorize a large number of individuals and institutions to access pa-
tient records. Certainly, Congress or the appropriate agency would
attempt to limit authorized users to the relevant portion of the record.
However, whether their purpose is clinical, financial, or regulatory,
most users would assert a need to know large portions of the record.
It is difficult to envisage the development of meaningful controls over
the kinds of data authorized individuals could obtain and the uses
they would make of those data. 60 For example, even the most pri-
156 INSTrruTE oF MEDICINE, supra note 25, at 31.
157 Id. at 32-33. Representative individual users include: (1) those concerned with
patient delivery such chaplains, dentists, dietitians, lab technologists, occupational ther-
apists, optometrists, and pharmacists; (2) those concerned with patient management such
as administrators, accountants, risk managers, and utilization review managers; and (3)
those concerned with patient care reimbursement such as benefit managers and govern-
mental and private insurers. Representative institutional users include: (1) entities con-
cerned with health care delivery such as health plans and networks of providers, donor
banks, ambulatory surgery centers, hospices, public health departments, and substance
abuse programs; (2) entities concerned with review of care such as Medicare peer review
organizations, quality assurance companies, and utilization management companies; (3)
entities concerned with research such as disease registries, health data organizations, and
health care technology developers; (4) entities concerned with education such as schools
of medicine, nursing, or public health; (5) entities concerned with accreditation such as
professional and institutional licensure agencies; and (6) entities concerned with poli-
cymaking such as federal or state government agencies. Id.
158 Id. at 34-35.
159 See supra parts I.D.2 and I.D.3.
160 At the most basic level it would be possible to limit pharmacists to information
concerning prescriptions or laboratory technicians to information about test results. Even
in these simple cases, however, pharmacists may assert a need to know a broader physical
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vacy-oriented bills in Congress provide health care professionals with
broad authority to disclose information without the patient's consent
for the purposes of treatment, reimbursement for services, oversight,
public health, emergencies, legally required reporting, health re-
search, law enforcement, and subpoenas and warrants. 16
Presumably, authorized users of health information would pos-
sess a patient identification number that would grant them access to
all or part of the electronic record.162 The unique identifier would
permit entry to many potential data sources held by government agen-
cies, health plans, health data organizations, and other information
holders. It follows that physicians, nurses, pharmacists, lab techni-
cians, administrators, payors, regulators, and many others could re-
trieve a comprehensive health record from any geographic area
linked to the health data network. Patients would not consent to ac-
cess other than in the most general way, and could not realistically
govern the manner in which data were utilized.
It is clear, moreover, that individuals and organizations that are
not explicitly authorized might also gain access to the information.
Powerful commercial reasons exist for obtaining access to health in-
formation. There is a market for the "sale of personal information
from both public and private sources, encouraged by financial incen-
tives for staff to supplement their income through unauthorized dis-
closures of personal information." 63 Unauthorized access to
personal information can be motivated by many factors. These in-
dude profiting from the sale of data to information brokers or mar-
keting firms; uncovering sensitive information about famous
individuals such as a history of mental illness, HIV infection, or a sexu-
ally transmitted disease; possessing information that may be helpful in
litigation such as malpractice actions; and using the information to
make employment or insurance decisions.
Simply because the collection of information is not specifically
authorized does not necessarily render it unlawful. It is possible to
and mental history to check for allergies, possible adverse effects, or multiple prescriptions;
and lab technicians may claim a need to know additional clinical details such as a person's
HIV status for tuberculin skin tests. Members of the multidisciplinary team, health plan
managers, third-party payers, and regulators are likely to seek broad access to the entire
record. Neither the existing bills in Congress, nor the strategic planning documents rec-
ommending a health information infrastructure, significantly limit access to authorized
users.
161 See Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1994, H.R. 4077, 103 Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994). The Bill is intended to be considered as part of the Health SecurityAct, supra note
88.
162 Not all users, of course, would have access to the entire record at all times. Some
users would have frequent access to the record, while others would access the record spo-
radically, and others still would never actually see the record, but would obtain data de-
rived from it. INsnrrtrE OF MEDICINE, supra note 25, at 31.
163 OTA PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 26.
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assemble a detailed personal dossier of an individual at very low cost
simply by obtaining lawful access to data in commercial and govern-
mental electronic databases.164 The Krever Commission in Canada 65
and the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment docu-
mented hundreds of successful attempts by private investigative firms,
newspapers, and others to acquire information without the consent of
patients at relatively little cost.' 66
Additionally, there exists a growing number of health data-base
organizations designed to further their own commercial interests.
These organizations use their lawful connections to the health care
system to collect and sell information, usually without the knowledge
or consent of patients.1 67 For example, the Medical Information Bu-
reau collects comprehensive health information, and informs its 700
member insurance companies about known actuarial risks of appli-
cants.' 68 Similarly, the Physician Computer Network, Inc. collects a
broad range of information about financial management, medical
records, and office management, and links its 2,000 office-based physi-
cians to hospitals, laboratories, insurers, pharmaceutical companies,
and managed-care providers. 169 These, and many other examples of
widespread information collection, suggest that as more individuals
and organizations gain lawful access to data there are innumerable
opportunities to lawfully aggregate, use, and sell the data for purposes
that patients never anticipated when the data were originally
collected. 70
Personal information can also be obtained in fraudulent ways.
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) suggests that the unlaw-
ful sale of personal information from data banks held by government
or the private sector, particularly medical information, is widespread.
164 The computer magazine Macword, for example, obtained a considerable amount
of personal information on celebrities through lawful means. The magazine spent an aver-
age of $112 and 75 minutes per subject. Charles Piller, Privacy in Peril, How Computers are
Making Private Life a Thing of the Past, MACWoRLD, July 1993, at 127-28.
165 The Royal Commission of Inquiry Into the Confidentiality of Health Records in
Ontario Canada (Chaired by Mr. Justice Horace Krever, 1980). See OTA PROTECrING PRI-
VACy, supra note 6, at 28 (discussing Krever Commission study).
166 OTA PROTECrING PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 2,-37.
167 SeeJonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the CommercialDissemination of
Personal Information, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1395, 1402-03 (1987).
168 OTA PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 32-33.
169 Id. at 33-35.
170 See, e.g., 1 INDEPENDENT COMM'N AGAINST CORRUPTION, REPORT ON UNAUTHORIZED
RELEASE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATiON ix (Aug. 1992) (Australia) (Ian Temby, Commis-
sioner) (finding "widespread corrupt trade" in government information); PRIVACY PROTEC-
TION STUDY COMM'N, supra note 13, at 3-6 (advocating a national policy regarding the
treatment of computerized records);JEFFREv RoTHFELDER, PRIVACY FOR SALE 31-88 (1992)
(discussing the proliferation of information sources available to credit reporting agencies
and the case of accessing sensitive information through licit and illicit means); Piller, supra
note 164, at 127-28 (demonstrating the ready accessibility of personal information).
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The OTA provides numerous examples of prosecutions for breaches
of privacy against current and former employees of the federal gov-
ernment (e.g., employees of the Social Security Administration and
Internal Revenue Service), local police officers accessing the FBI's Na-
tional Crime Information Center, and private information brokers. 71
There are several primary methods for obtaining unlawful access to
personal information: entering into contracts with employees who
have access to the information; paying sums of money to outside enti-
ties that already have legitimate access such as insurance companies;
obtaining the person's social security number and using it to access
the computerized record; and pretending to be an authorized user
from another office whose computers are down, an activity referred to
as "pretexting."172
An extensive health information infrastructure, then, creates nu-
merous opportunities for invasion of privacy. The sheer number of
authorized users, the potential for lawful access without explicit au-
thority, and the threat of fraudulent access render it virtually impossi-
ble to ensure significant levels of privacy for patients under the
national information system contemplated.
B. The Sensitive Nature of Health Information and the Harms
of Disclosure
The problem for persons concerned with privacy is not simply the
almost inexhaustible opportunities for access to data but also the inti-
mate nature of those data, the potential for harm to persons whose
privacy is violated, and the overall effect on the health care system if
privacy is eroded.
Only a few generations ago, physicians kept minimal written
records about their patients. Physicians usually knew their patients
and did not see a need to maintain extensive written reminders of
patients' clinical histories. Today, the quantity of health records and
the nature of the data they contain have increased substantially. 73
The health records of patients, therefore, contain significant amounts
of sensitive information that are available for inspection by many
others. 74 Modern medicine understands a great deal more about the
effects on a patient's physical and mental health of human behavior
(e.g., sexuality, smoking, alcohol use, or drug injection and needle
sharing), genetic profile (based on family history and genetic testing),
171 OTA PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 26-29.
172 Privacy of Social Security Records: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and
Family Policy of the Senate Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 62-67 (1992) (statement of Larry D.
Morey, Deputy Inspector General for Investigations, Department of Health and Human
Services), cited in OTA PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 29.
173 PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, supra note 13, at 277.
174 HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 140.
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and social conditions (e.g., poverty, nutrition, and social relation-
ships). Physicians document these and other personal data not only
to ensure better treatment and continuity of care but also to protect
against allegations of malpractice.
It follows that health records contain a vast amount of personal
information with multiple uses: demographic information, such as
age, sex, race, and occupation; financial information, such as employ-
ment status and income; information about disabilities, special needs,
and other eligibility criteria for federal or state subsidies; medical in-
formation such as diagnoses, treatments, and disease histories, includ-
ing mental illness, drug or alcohol dependency, acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome, and sexually transmitted diseases; per-
sonal and social information such as sexual orientation, family status,
sexual relationships, and lifestyle choices; and information about be-
ing the subject or perpetrator of violent behavior such as rape, spousal
or child abuse, or firearm injuries. This information is frequently suf-
ficient to provide a detailed profile of the individual. Traditional
medical records, moreover, are only a subset of records containing
substantial health or personal information held by educators, employ-
ers, social services, immigration, law enforcement, credit and banking
institutions, and many others.
A variety of underlying harms to patients may result from un-
wanted disclosures of these sensitive health data. Intrinsic harms re-
sult from the mere fact of an unwanted or unjustified disclosure of
personal information. Many moral views recognize the desirability of
protecting individuals against the insult to dignity and the lack of re-
spect for the person evidenced by such disclosures. Furthermore, a
breach of privacy can result in economic harms such as loss of employ-
ment, insurance, or housing. It can also result in social or psychologi-
cal harms. Disclosure of some conditions can be stigmatizing, and can
cause embarrassment, social isolation, and a loss of self-esteem. These
risks are especially great when the perceived causes of the health con-
dition include the use of illegal drugs, socially disfavored forms of sex-
ual expression, or other behavior that triggers social disapproval.
Moreover, stigmatization may be a consequence of such disclosures in
some instances even when the potential causes do not involve any de-
spised choices or behavior on the part of the affected individual. Fam-
ily members, neighbors, and work associates may withdraw social
support from individuals known to have certain conditions, especially
mental or emotional instability, or physical or behavioral attributes
that some people find uncomfortable to observe.
Maintaining reasonable levels of privacy is essential to the effec-
tive functioning of the health and public health systems. Patients are
less likely to divulge sensitive information to health professionals if
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they are not assured that their confidences will be respected. The
consequence of incomplete information is that patients may not re-
ceive adequate diagnosis and treatment 'of important health condi-
tions. Moreover, failure to divulge communicable conditions such as
HIV infection may pose a risk to the health of sexual or needle-shar-
ing partners. Persons at risk of disease may not come forward for the
testing, counseling or treatment necessary to protect the public
health. Informational privacy, therefore, is valued not only to protect
patients' social and economic interests, but also their health and the
health of the wider community.
Genomic data present particularly novel and far-reaching privacy
concerns, making these data distinct but not unique.175 The current
and likely future proliferation of genetic databases means that holders
of these genomic data will possess vast amounts of information. 176
The potential uses of the genetic material are considerable, ranging
from clinical, research, and public health applications to determining
parentage and providing forensic evidence.
Genomic data can personally identify an individual and his or her
bloodline, and provide a more complete profile of current and future
health with far more scientific accuracy than other health data. The
features of a person revealed by genetic information are fixed-un-
changing and unchangeable. Genetic information does not simply re-
veal important health and personal characteristics of individuals, but
also provides important biological facts about their parents, siblings,
and children. Genomic data also contain information that is presently
indecipherable, but may be unlocked by new scientific understand-
ing.177 Finally, societies in the past have sought to control the gene
pool through eugenics. This becomes particularly worrisome because
different genetic characteristics occur with different frequencies in ra-
cial and ethnic populations. Although enormous human benefits may
accrue from understanding the etiology and pathophysiology of ge-
netic disease, the systematic collection of genomic information holds
the potential for grave personal and social detriment.178
The combination of emerging computer and genetic technolo-
gies poses particularly compelling privacy concerns. Science has the
175 See generally PRIVACY COMM'R OF CAN., GENErIc TESTING AND PRIVACY (1992) (dis-
cussing the threat of genetic identification for personal freedom); E. Donald Shapiro &
Michelle Weinberg, DNA Data Banking The Dangerous Erosion of-Privacy, 38 CLEV. ST. L
REv. 455, 465 (1990) (discussing privacy concerns regarding DNA profiling); Gorgey, supra
note 118 (considering the privacy concerns arising from DNA profiling).
176 See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
177 Annas, supra note 118, at 234647.
178 See Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and
Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM.J.L. & MED. 109, 110-11 (1991); NIH-DOE
WORKING GROUP ON ETHICAL, LECAL, AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF HuMAN GENOME RE
sEACRn, GEN iC INF ORMAON AND HEALTH INSURANCE (1993).
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capacity to store a million fragments of DNA on a silicon microchip.
Each DNA chip is loaded with information about human genes.
When a component of a patient's blood is placed on the chip, it
reveals specific information about the individual's health and genetic
composition, potentially ranging from a carrier state (e.g., cystic fibro-
sis) or a future disease (e.g., Huntington's chorea), to genetic rela-
tionships (e.g., establishing paternity or forensic matching of
DNA).179 This technology can markedly facilitate research, screening,
and treatment of genetic conditions. But it may also permit a signifi-
cant reduction in privacy through its capacity to inexpensively store
and decipher unimaginable quantities of highly sensitive data.
C. The Enhancing Power of Automation
Automation of health data is frequently presented as an opportu-
nity to improve informational privacy.'80 And security measures
designed to protect data held in electronic form can be effective: per-
sonal identifiers can provide a security key to restrict entry into the
information system; information can be organized in levels of increas-
ing security so that users can receive only those data for which they
are authorized; health care providers can disclose only the informa-
tion needed for specific purposes, rather than disclosing a patient's
entire medical record; and audits of all individuals who have used the
system can help determine if there has been inappropriate or fraudu-
lent access.' 8 '
Privacy advocates, on the other hand, see computerization as a
significant threat to privacy.'82 As vastly greater quantities of informa-
179 See Ralph T. King, Jr., Soon, A Chip Will Test Blood forDiseases, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25,
1994, at Bi.
180 See, e.g., Hearings on Fair Health Information Practices Ac of 1994, H.1 4077 Before the
Subcomm. on Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture of the House Comm. on Govern-
mental Operations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Nan D. Hunter, Deputy Gen-
eral Counsel, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) (available in LEXIS, Legis.
Library, CNGTST file).
181 See OTA FEaERAL GovE mE r TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 37-38; SysTEM SECUR-
rwy STUDY Comm., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTERs AT RIsK: SAFE COMPUTING IN
THE INFORMATION AGE (1990); OTA DEFENDING SEcRETs, supra note 59, at 51-91.
182 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan J., concurring) ("The cen-
tral storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for
abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not
demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology."); see also ARTHUR MILLER,
THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY' COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSsIERS (1971); Graham, supra
note 167, at 1402-05; Arthur Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Over-
vew, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1972); Arthur Miller, Personal Privacy in the Com-
puter Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L.
Rrv. 1089, 1107-19 (1969); Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration:
The Failure of the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HAsINGs L.J. 1321, 1344-48
(1992);John Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-Match-
ing, and Privacy in the U.S., 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991,991 (1984); Project, Government Information
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tion are collected and transmitted to an ever increasing number of
users in remote locations, the ability of consumers to control the dis-
semination of personal information is sharply reduced18 3 While elec-
tronic records are not qualitatively different than manual records, it is
much easier to build a personal dossier using automated, on line, and
interconnected systems.1 84
Oddly, the claim that computers provide greater security and that
they increase the potential for invasion of privacy are both true. Com-
puter security can deter most unauthorized persons from gaining ac-
cess to the system and can limit the degree of access for authorized
users. This can assure significant improvement in security for health
information. However, security is never perfect. It will always be pos-
sible for determined and sophisticated hackers to gain entry into sys-
tems containing huge amounts of personal data.185 More important,
the raison d'tre of an automated health information system is to make
data readily available to a broad range of authorized users. It is the
proliferation of these legitimate users of information that pose the
greatest risk to informational privacy. No computer security system
can control how information is disseminated by individuals and orga-
nizations that have legitimate access to data. Increased security, then,
does not ensure increased privacy.186 Even though advancing technol-
ogy allows for more rigorous security, automation's potential to make
individuals more vulnerable to privacy invasions needs to be faced
directly.
Manual records also pose problems of privacy and security, but
these problems are less severe than those in the electronic data con-
text. Manual records are often maintained by the health care pro-
vider in secure locations with limited numbers of persons having
and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L REv. 971, 1221-340 (1975); Paul Schwartz, Administra-
tive Law: The Oversight of Data Protection Law, 39 AM.J. Come. L. 618 (1991) (book review).
183 Of course, collection of personal information is not limited to health information.
Federal agencies reported that they collected and stored personal information on individu-
als in approximately 2,000 predominantly computerized systems, principally for the pur-
poses 6f payment, eligibility, and investigations. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPUTERS AND
PRIVACY. How GovERNMENT OBTAINs, VEmIES, USES, AND PROTECTS PERSoNAL DATA,
GAO/ITEC-90-70BP, 10, 16 (1990).
184 See HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 8, at 136-42; OTA PRoTECT-
ING PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 23-37; WORKGROUP FOR ELEcrRoNIc DATA INTERCHANGE, supra
note 30, app. 2 at 3-4.
185 See, e.g., Evan Hendricks, Hacker "Manual" Tells Wannabes How to Penetrate TRW
Database, PIVACY TIMES July 30, 1992, at 1-2 (reporting the electronic publication of in-
structions for accessing consumer credit databases).
186 Security and privacy are distinct and separable concepts. Privacy, although a highly
complex concept, is defined as the right of an individual to limit access by others to some
aspect of the person. See supra note 18. Security encompasses a set of technical and admin-
istrative procedures designed to protect data systems against unwarranted disclosure, modi-
fication, or destruction and to safeguard the system itself. Security measures alone do not
assure protection of privacy.
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physical access. The cumbersome nature of manual records makes it
an arduous task to acquire, copy, and use them. The relevant data
may be held in many different records in diverse locations, making it
difficult to combine data from separate sources.
By contrast, computerization makes it easy to enter, transmit,
copy, or delete vast amounts of data. The acquisition and dissemina-
tion of information is efficient, rapid, and silent. In an electronic, on-
line system, the data can be viewed, studied, and downloaded from
any location. The viewer of the information has not acquired any
physical materials, making any theft virtually undetectable. Moreover,
the viewer of electronic data is not restricted to one set of records but
can access many records in diverse geographic locations and
databases. This linking capacity allows aggregation, comparisons and
matching of data to discover much more about the private lives of
patients. Thus, even data that have no personal identifiers may be
linked to other data that provide a picture of an identifiable person or
population. The linking capacity of computers also enables health
database organizations to select characteristics of types of individuals,
and to determine the probabilities of such individuals engaging in ac-
tivities or behavior of interest to the organization. This use of "com-
puter profiling" could, for example, be used to identify individuals
who pose a risk to themselves or others due to communicable or sexu-
ally transmitted diseases or the failure to take medication.1 87
Computerization allows patient records to be continually updated
as new information is added from an abundant number of sources.
Thus, continually changing, updated, reconfigured, and manipulated
information of vast quantity will be instantaneously available to an in-
definable number of users in doctors' offices, health plans, hospitals,
and insurance offices-across the state, the country and, quite proba-
bly, internationally. The rapid and sophisticated ways that data can be
changed and configured, together with the absence of any discrete
geographic boundaries for dissemination, provide a dilemma of new
dimension for protecting informational privacy.
I
LEGAL PROTECTION OF HEALTH INFORMATIONAL PRiVACY
If society truly believes that the utility of health information war-
rants building automated and linked systems, it must reckon with the
potential diminution in privacy. One method of affording some mea-
sure of privacy protection to patients would be to furnish rigorous
legal safeguards. However, as this Part demonstrates, the existing
187 See OTA FEDERAL Gov mENr TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 87-95 (finding that
the government engages in extensive computer profiling, defined as searching a record
system for a specified combination of data elements, i.e., the profile).
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legal safeguards are inadequate: Current privacy protection is frag-
mented and inconsistent, with major gaps in coverage, and there are
significant theoretical problems with its structure. 8 8
A. Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy
A considerable literature has emerged on the existence and ex-
tent of a constitutional right to informational privacy independent of
the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures.' 8 9 To some, judicial recognition of a constitutional right to
informational privacy is particularly important since the government
is the principal collector and disseminator of information. Citizens, it
is argued, should not have to rely on the government choosing to pro-
tect their privacy interests. Rather, individuals need protection from
the government itself, and an effective constitutional remedy is the
surest method to shield them from unauthorized government acquisi-
tion or disclosure of personal information. 9 0 The problem with this
approach is that the Constitution does not expressly provide a right to
privacy, and the Supreme Court has curtailed constitutional protec-
tion both for decisional and informational privacy.191
Notwithstanding the Court's current retreat, a body of case law
does suggest judicial recognition of a limited right to informational
privacy as a liberty interest within the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution. In Whalen v. Roe,192 the Supreme Court
squarely faced the question of whether the constitutional right to pri-
vacy encompasses the collection, storage, and dissemination of health
information in government data banks.' 93 At issue was a New York
statute requiring physicians to disclose to the state information about
188 WORKGROUP FOR ELEcrRONIc DATA INTERCHANGE, supra note 30, app. 4 at iii (The
myriad federal and state laws on health information privacy defy ea.y categorization. "The
result: a morass of erratic law, both statutory and judicial, defining the provider's confi-
dentiality obligation.").
189 See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Pivacy
and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L RFN. 1 (1991); Richard C. Turkington,
Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to
Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILu.. U. L Rav. 479 (1990); Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The
Constitutional Protection of Informational Privay, 71 B.U. L. REv. 133 (1991); Heyward C.
Hosch III, Note, The Interest in Limiting the Disclosure of Personal Information: A Constitutional
Analysis, 36 VArN. L. REV. 139 (1983).
190 Chlapowski, supra note 189, at 134.
191 See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
192 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
193 More than a decade prior to Whalen, the Ninth Circuit found that police action in
distributing a nude photograph of a woman without her consent could constitute "an arbi-
trary intrusion upon the security of her privacy, as guaranteed to her by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 456 (9th Cir. 1963).
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit limited York to its facts. Baker v. Howard, 419 F.2d 376,
377 (9th Cir. 1969).
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prescriptions for certain drugs with a high potential for abuse and
providing for the storage of those data in a central computer. In
dicta, the Court acknowledged "the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computer-
ized data banks or other massive government files.' 94
However, the Court hardly crafted a constitutional remedy ade-
quate to meet this threat. Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous
court, simply recognized that "in some circumstances" the duty to
avoid unwarranted disclosures "arguably has its roots in the Constitu-
tion."' 95 The Court found no violation in Whalen because the state
had adequate standards and procedures for protecting the privacy of
sensitive medical information. The Court observed that the Health
Department carefully guarded data on dangerous prescription drugs:
computer tapes were kept in a locked cabinet; the computer was run
off line to avoid accessibility by others; and the information was only
disclosed to a limited number of officials. 196 The decision in Whalen
does little to ensure that future courts will hold health officials to ex-
acting constitutional standards to protect privacy. Rather, the Court
suggested deferentially that the supervision of public health and other
important government activities "require the orderly preservation of
great quantities of information, much of which is personal in charac-
ter and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed." 197
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Seroices, s9 8 decided four
months after WhaLen, the Court also hesitantly acknowledged a narrow
right to privacy.199 The former President of the United States chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a statute directing the Administrator of
the General Services Administration to take custody of Presidential
materials and to have them screened by federal archivists. The Court
recognized that the former President had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his personal communications. However, it upheld the con-
stitutionality of the statute due to the limited intrusion of the screen-
ing process, the appellant's status as a public figure, his lack of
expectation of privacy in the overwhelming majority of materials, and
the virtual impossibility of segregating the small quantity of private
materials without comprehensive screening. The Court also empha-
194 429 U.S. at 605.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 593-94.
197 Id. at 605.
198 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
199 See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976) (appearing to
recognize an independent right to informational privacy, but upholding reporting and
record-keeping requirements that were reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal
health and properly respected a patient's confidentiality).
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sized the statute's sensitivity to legitimate privacy interests and the un-
blemished record of the archivists for discretion.200
Most lower courts have read Whalen and Nixon as affording a
tightly circumscribed right to informational privacy,201 or have
grounded the right on state constitutional provisions. 20 2 Courts have
employed a flexible test balancing the government invasion of pri-
vacy20 3 against the strength of the government interest.204 For exam-
ple, the Third Circuit in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.20 5
enunciated five factors to be balanced in determining the scope of the
constitutional right to informational privacy: (1) the type of record
and the information it contains, (2) the potential for harm in any
unauthorized disclosure, (3) the injury from disclosure to the rela-
tionship in which the record was generated, (4) the adequacy of safe-
guards to prevent nonconsensual disclosure, and (5) the degree of
need for access-i.e., a recognizable public interest.206
Judicial deference to government's expressed need to acquire
and use information is an unmistakable theme running through the
case law. Provided the government articulates a valid societal pur-
pose207 and employs reasonable security measures, courts have not in-
terfered with traditional governmental activities of information
collection.
200 433 U.S. at 465.
201 But seeJ.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that the right to
privacy does not extend to a general right to nondisclosure of personal information). The
Sixth Circuit relied on Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) in rejecting a constitutional right
to informational privacy. In Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that publication by the
police department of the fact that a person was arrested for shoplifting did not raise a
constitutional question, relying, in part, on the fact that there was no constitutional bar to
government publishing a record of an official act such as an arrest. 424 U.S. at 713.
202 See People v. Stritzinger, 668 P.2d 738, 742 (Cal. 1983); Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Of-
fices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469, 476 (Alaska 1977). Some courts have found a right to infor-
mational privacy in both the state and federal constitutions. Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood
Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). Rasmussen is the most prominent of many cases
addressing informational privacy after courts are asked to compel disclosure of health in-
formation through subpoena.
203 The greater the government efforts to avoid nonconsensual disclosure, the weaker
the individual's privacy interest.
204 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458 ("[A]ny intrusion must be weighed against the public
interest in subjecting the Presidential materials... to archival screening.").
205 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
206 Id. at 578. The Third Circuit used the Westinghouse factors in In re Search Warrant
(Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 71-72 (3d Cir. 1987).
207 See, e.g., Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578-79 (noting strong public interest in facilitat-
ing research and investigations of National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health);
Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1560 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding city's financial
disclosure law furthered a substantial state interest in deterring corruption and conflicts of
interest); Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding information crucial
to implementation of sound state policy of investigating licensed physicians for medical
misconduct).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The right to privacy under the Constitution is, of course, limited
to state action. Since the 1970s, more than a dozen states have
adopted constitutional amendments designed to protect a variety of
privacy interests, including limitations on access to personal informa-
tion.208 Because most of the state constitutional provisions only pro-
tect against breaches of privacy by government,20 9 the usual state
action limitation renders constitutional claims uncertain. As long as
the federal or state government itself collects information or requires
other entities to collect it, state action will not be a central obstacle.
However, several versions of a health information infrastructure envis-
age private or quasi-private health data organizations, health plans,
and insurers collecting a great deal of information.2 10 In these cases,
the applicability of constitutional privacy protection would remain in
doubt, particularly if database organizations were essentially unregu-
lated by government.
Even in cases where government unambiguously is the collector
of data, constitutional limitations may be nominal at best.2 1 1 Courts
allow states wide latitude in protecting the public health,212 and courts
are certain to see government purposes of quality assurance, cost con-
tainment, or research as substantial, if not compelling. Since policy
development on health information pays some attention to privacy
and security concerns, the government is likely to prevail on a flexible
balancing approach.2 13 Absent an improbable upward shift in the
courts' level of scrutiny, issues of health informational privacy will be
settled in the legislative and executive branches of government.
208 ROBERT E. SMITH, CoMPILATIoN OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVAcY Lws 17-18 (1981).
209 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv. Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987);
Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 83 (Ct. App. 1991).
210 See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
211 Individuals asserting a constitutional right to informational privacy are unlikely to
obtain a remedy save in cases where the state fails to assert any significant interest or is
particularly careless in disclosing highly sensitive information. See Doe v. Borough of Bar-
rington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.NJ. 1990) (holding that police officer violated constitutional
right to privacy by disclosing that a person was infected with HIV); Woods v. White, 689 F.
Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (extending constitutional right to privacy to disclosure of pris-
oner's HIV status by prison medical service personnel), affld, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990);
Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Ctr., 667 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (holding that giving
chaplains open access to patient medical record. violated privacy rights of patients), cert.
denied 489 U.S. 1096 (1989).
212 SeeJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); see also Lawrence 0. Gostin, The
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Corpus of Anti-Discrimination Law: A Force for Change in
the Future of Public Health Regulation, 3 HEALTH MATmx 89, 91-103 (1993).
213 One thoughtful commentator has argued that, even if constitutional claims of in-
formational privacy are likely to lose, a significant value to consumers remains, because an
ad hoc balancing approach compels government officials to consider privacy when con-
structing government policies and operating procedures. Kreimer, supra note 189, at 147.
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B. Legislative and Regulatory Protection of Informational Privacy
Legislatures and agencies have designed a growing number of
statutes and regulations to protect privacy in a developing information
society.2 14 Legislative and regulatory protection comes in at least six
forms: (1) the Privacy Act,215 (2) the Freedom of Information Act,216
(3) drug and alcohol privacy regulations, 217 (4) research regulations,
(5) confidentiality assurances, 218 and (6) state privacy legislation.2 19
1. Ptivacy Act
The federal Privacy Act of 1974220 is designed to ensure that fed-
eral agencies221 utilize fair information practices with regard to the
collection, use, or dissemination of "any record"222 which is contained
214 For a discussion offederal privacy statutes that apply primarily outside of the health
system (e.g., the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U'S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988); the Right to
Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1988); and the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (1988)), see RicaxA C. TURmINGTON ET AL., PRIVACY:
CASES AND M&TERaus 341-51 (1992).
215 See infra part IIAl.
216 See infra part lI.A.2.
217 See infra part mIA3.
218 See infra part m.A.4.
219 See infra part MA5. Other federal statutes protecting health informational privacy
are: (1) the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1106 (1988), which prohibits disclosure of any
file, record, or other information obtained by officers or employees of the Department of
Health and Human Services or its contractors, except as prescribed by regulation (42
C.F.R. § 401.101-.152 (1994)); and (2) the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(c) (1988), which requires that the results of employment entrance and post-em-
ployment examinations and inquiries be maintained in separate medical files, and be
treated as confidential medical records.
220 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(3), (6) (1988).
221 "Agency" is defined to include any. executive department, military department, gov-
ernment corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of government (in-
cluding the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory commission.
5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (1988).
222 A "record" is "any item, collection, or grouping of identifiable information about
an individual maintained by an agency, including.., his medical history...." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(a) (4) (1988). The definition is broad and includes most forms of data about an
individual, including videotapes. See Albright v. United'States, 631 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
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in "a system of records."223 First, subject to a number of exceptions,224
the Act prohibits agencies from disclosing information to any person
or to another agency without the prior written consent of the individ-
ual to whom the record pertains.225 Second, each agency that main-
tains a system of records must also, upon request, permit the
individual to review and copy the record.226 Third, the Act provides a
procedure by which an individual may request the correction or
amendment of the record.227 Finally, the Act requires agencies to
maintain in their records only personal information that is relevant
and necessary to accomplish the agency's purpose.228 The Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, which amends the Pri-
vacy Act, regulates the practice of "matching" files pertaining to the
same person through the use of a personal identifier.229
Hospitals operated by the federal government and health care or
research institutions operated pursuant to federal contract must main-
tain patient records in compliance with the Act. For example, hospi-
tals that maintain registers of cancer patients pursuant to a federal
contract are subject to the Act. 280 The application of the Privacy Act
in an evolving health information infrastructure is less certain. To the
extent that data are collected by a federal agency such as the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services or a special agency within the
executive branch, the provisions of the Privacy Act would apply. The
223 A "system of records" is defined as a group of any records under the control of any
agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or other identifi-
able characteristic. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (5) (1988). Data held by an agency that are not part
of a system of records are not protected by the Act-for example, informal memoranda or
personal notes about an individual which are not retrievable from a record system. See
Johnston v. Home, 875 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir. 1989) (Supervisor's private notes are not
generally subject to requirements of Privacy Act, unless agency uses them to make deci-
sions that concern person's employment status); Smiertka v. United States Dep't of Treas-
ury, Internal Revenue Service, 447 F. Supp. 221, 228 (D.D.C. 1978) (daily reports by agency
investigator containing reference to investigation of employee are not subject to require-
ments of Privacy Act); Savarese v. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 479 F. Supp. 304,
307 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (holding that where files are not keyed for retrieval, information
concerning former officer taken from files is not part of system of records and thus is not
subject to Privacy Act), affd sub nom. Savarese v. Harris, 620 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981).
224 Agencies may disclose records (1) to agency employees who need the record for
the performance of their duties, (2) for "routine" use, (3) to the Bureau of the Census, (4)
to recipients for statistical research or reporting if the record is unidentifiable, (5) to the
National Archives, (6) to another agency for civil or criminal law enforcement, (7) to a
person showing compelling circumstances affecting health or safety, (8) to Congress, (9)
to the Comptroller General, pursuant to a court order, or (10) to a consumer reporting
agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)-(12) (1988).
225 Id. § 552a(b).
226 Id. § 552a(d) (1).
227 Id. § 552a(d) (2)-(4).
228 Id. § 552a(e).
229 Id. § 552a(o).
230 OTA PROTECrING PaRIVACY, supra note 6, at 42.
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Act, however, does not apply to the vast majority of entities that collect
health information outside of the federal government.2'
Even agencies that collect information within the purview of the
Act may circumvent its essential purposes. Agencies may disclose in-
formation for "routine uses," meaning that they can use health
records for any "purpose which is compatible with the purpose for
which [the information] was collected."23 2 Health agencies have used
this concept to justify many further uses of personally identifiable in-
formation.233 For example, the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion (HCFA) has a policy of releasing to researchers data collected
from patient records by Medicare Peer Review Organizations and
stored in the Uniform Clinical Data Set, with patient names and pro-
vider identifiers intact.2 34 HCFA argues that the disclosure is consis-
tent with the "routine uses" provisions of the Privacy Act because
research is compatible with the agency's purpose for collecting the
data. While courts might reject HCFA's interpretation, it suggests that
the Privacy Act may not be an effective shield against disclosure of
personal information by the government.23 5
2. Freedom of Information Act
In enacting the Privacy Act, Congress did not seek to interfere
with the right of the public to obtain access to information in federal
agency records under the Freedom of Information Act of 1966
(FOIA).236 Accordingly, information that is required to be disclosed
under FOIA has no protection under the Privacy Act.237 The FOIA
contains nine exemptions to this rule that permit agencies to withhold
disclosure.2 38 Exemption 3,239 which covers data specifically excluded
from FOIA disclosure requirements by statute, has been utilized ex-
tensively by the Department of Health and Human Services and other
agencies to protect health data.240
231 See Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hosp. Found. Inc., 5 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that release of medical records of federal employee's wife and son would not violate Pri-
vacy Act because hospitals are not "agencies" of federal government.).
232 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) (1988).
233 OTA PROTEMrING PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 41 n.39.
234 Notice of New System of Records, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,078 (1991).
235 See WORKGROUP FOR ELEcTROdc DATA INTERCHANGE, supra note 30, app. 4 at 8-9.
236 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
237 Id. § 552a(b) (2).
238 Id. § 552(b).
239 Id. §552(b)(3).
240 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 9 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (Department of Commerce raw cen-
sus data); 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (Supp. V 1993) (Department of Health and Human Services
drug abuse patient records); 38 U.S.C. § 5701 (Supp. V 1993) (Veterans' Administration
claimants' medical and insurance records); 38 U.S.C. § 5705 (Supp. V 1993) (Veterans'
Administration Department of Medicine peer review and quality assurance documents); 42
U.S.C. § 242m(d) (Supp. V 1993) (Department of Health and Human Services identifiable
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Exemption 4 concerns "privileged or confidential" data.241 Fed-
eral health agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, have sought to rely on this exemption to resist discovery of
confidential patient or research records in cases such as those involv-
ing toxic shock, Reyes syndrome, and cancer registry data.242 The pre-
vailing judicial view, however, is that information that is privileged
from disclosure under the FOIA may nevertheless be subject to discov-
ery.243 Courts use Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
determine the scope of permissible discovery in civil litigation.244 The
courts balance privacy interests of individuals whose identities may be
disclosed in the litigation against the parties' interests in the adminis-
tration ofjustice; Rule 26 allows the courts to fashion creative protec-
tive orders that permit necessary discovery while limiting
infringements on privacy.245
Exemption 624 protects "personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosures of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy."247 The Supreme Court has adopted a
broad construction of this exemption, allowing federal agencies to
protect individuals from the injury and embarrassment that can result
from the unnecessary disclosure of personal information. 248 When an
FOIA disclosure is sought from personally identifiable government
records, a court must determine whether release of the information
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy by balanc-
ing the individual's privacy interest with the public's interest in the
information. 249
Although FOIA exemptions can be useful in protecting personal
data, they suffer from several limitations. Assuming the data come
within one of the listed exemptions, the agency itself has the discre-
health statistics); 38 U.S.C. § 7332 (Supp. V 1993) (Veterans' Administration drug abuse,
alcoholism, and sickle cell patient records); 42 U.S.C. § 247c(e) (5) (Supp. V 1993) (De-
partment of Health and Human Services venereal disease records).
241 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1988).
242 Washington Post v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 258 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
243 Id.
244 Unless limited by court order, "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any mat-
ter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter in the [litigation]." FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b) (1). Determinations as to whether a privilege exists is governed by state law. FED.
R. EVID. 501.
245 See Lampshire v. Procter &'Gamble Co., 94 F.R.D. 58, 60 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Farns-
worth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 101 F.R.D. 355, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1984), afd, 758 F.2d 1545
(l1th Cir. 1985); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv. Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
246 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (1988).
247 Id.
248 U.S. Dep't of State v. Washington Post, 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966)).
249 Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 370-76 (1976).
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tion, not a duty, to withhold disclosure.2 0 Further, the judgment of
the agency is subject to judicial review under an unpredictable balanc-
ing test that is not always favorable to the individual's assertion of pri-
vacy.251 Accordingly, health care, epidemiological, or research data
held by an agency is not assured protection from an FOIA disclosure
request or from discovery in civil litigation.
3. Drug and Alcohol Treatment Records
Federal law prescribes special privacy rules for the records of pa-
tients receiving care for drug or alcohol dependency in federally
funded facilities.252 .Strict confidentiality rules apply to oral and writ-
ten communications of "[r ] ecords of the identity, diagnosis, progno-
sis, or treatment of any patient which are maintained in connection
with the performance" of any educational, rehabilitative, research,
training, or treatment program relating to drug or alcohol abuse.2 55
The confidentiality rules apply to any program or activity conducted,
regulated, or directly or indirectly assisted by a federal agency. Sub-
ject to certain exceptions,2M the content of a drug or alcohol treat-
ment record can be disclosed only with the consent of the patient.255
These disease-specific confidentiality statutes create inconsisten-
cies in the rules governing dissemination of information. Different
standards apply to data held by the same federally assisted institutions
depending on whether the patient is receiving treatment for sub-
stance abuse or some other disease. Furthermore, information about
drug and alcohol abuse entered into medical records in nonfederally
funded facilities is not protected. Overly strict confidentiality rules
could also impede the dissemination of data relating to drug or alco-
hol dependency treatment for valid purposes such as billing or public
health.2 6 The creation of strict disease-specific standards so much re-
strains the dissemination of data in some systems that legitimate
health goals are undermined, while other categories of data receive
insufficient protection. Any argument that drug and alcohol abuse
data deserve special protection rests on a weak foundation because
many other health conditions raise similar issues of sensitivity and inti-
250 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979).
251 See, e.g., United States v. Providence Hosp., 507 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(upholding IRS subpoena of hospital substance abuse records).
252 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (Supp. V 1993).
253 5 42 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3 (1988), which has been incorpo-
rated into 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
254 Patient records can be disclosed without consent for medical emergencies; scien-
tific research, audits, or program evaluations; and by court order for good cause. 42 U.S.C.
§ 290dd-2(b) (Supp. V 1993).
255 The consent must meet the requirements prescribed by regulation. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 2.31 (1998).
256 See WORKGROUP FOR ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE, supra note 30, app. 4 at 10.
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macy (e.g., HIV infection, STDs, genetic conditions, and mental ill-
nesses). Indeed, carving out special legal protection for especially
sensitive data is inherently faulty, because the desired scope of privacy
encompassing a health condition varies from individual to individual.
Some patients may be just as sensitive about prevalent diseases such as
cancer, heart disease, and diabetes as those diseases selected by legisla-
tors to receive "special" protection. 257
4. Research Regulations
Human subject research which is conducted or supported by a
federal department or agency must comply with regulations designed
to protect human subjects.2 8 Among other requirements, applicable
research must be approved by a validly constituted Institutional Re-
view Board (IRB). One of the conditions of approval by the IRB is
that "[w]hen appropriate, there are adequate provisions to protect
the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data."259
Furthermore, except where provided in the rules, no investigator may
engage a human being as a subject without first obtaining legally ef-
fective informed consent. In seeking informed consent, the investiga-
tor must provide the subject with "[a] statement describing the extent,
if any, to which confidentiality of records identifying the subject will
be maintained."260
Significant gaps in the protection of data about research subjects
are apparent. Although the rules apply to research funded by the fed-
eral government, private research remains unregulated. Moreover,
several categories of research are exempt from the regulations, includ-
ing investigations involving the collection or study of existing data,
documents, records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens,
if these sources are publicly available or non-identifiable.2 61 Genetic
data bases are especially problematic because they are often termed
non-identifiable despite the existence of technology that can link ge-
nomic data to a unique individual.
There is considerable variation in the rigor with which IRBs re-
view research studies.2 62 Even if IRBs do take confidentiality concerns
seriously, the regulations themselves merely require safeguards when
"appropriate." Although subjects must be informed whether or not
their data is to be held confidentially, the regulations allow investiga-
tors to provide no protection, provided the subject consents. Given
257 See infra part llI.B.6.ii.
258 Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.404 (1993).
259 Id. § 46.111 (a) (7).
260 Id. § 46.116(a) (5).
261 Id. § 46.101(b) (4).
262 SeeJay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. Louis U. LJ. 7, 14
(1993).
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the acknowledged vulnerability of research subjects, the apparent tol-
eration of the waiver of confidentiality in the regulations may not be
justified.
Even if the subject provides informed consent to use personal
data for the particular research purposes, there is no clear explication
in the regulations of further uses that may be made of the data. The
original investigator may disclose personal data to other researchers,
regulators, and others for related or nonrelated purposes. The data
may be given to others in an anonymous form, presumably exempt
from the federal regulations. Yet, human subjects may feel violated if
they provide consent for research on breast cancer, for instance, and
their tissue is later used as part of a genetic data base to identify rare
cell lines. Since research is one of the primary justifications for acqui-
sition and use of data, the need for dearer and more comprehensive
protection is apparent.
5. Confidentiality Assurances
Under section 301 (d) of the Public Health Service Act 263 the Sec-
retary may authorize persons engaged in biomedical, behavioral,
clinical, or other research to protect the privacy of research subjects
by withholding their names or other identifying characteristics from
all persons not connected with the conduct of the research. 26 Per-
sons authorized to protect the privacy of research subjects cannot be
compelled in any civil, criminal, administrative, legislative or other
proceeding to identify research subjects.2 65
263 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) (1988).
264 Id. The origins of confidentiality assurances date back to the drug war of the 1970s.
See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1236 (for drug abuse research). The Attorney General was given a similar authority to
"authorize persons engaged in research to withhold the names and other identifying char-
acteristics of... subjects." See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 872(c) (1988); see
a/so 21 C.F.R. § 1316.23 (1994) (The confidentiality assurance is administered by the Drug
Enforcement Administration and is available only for research related to enforcement of
laws relating to drugs.). Confidentiality assurances were expanded to cover research on
"mental health, including research on the use and effect of alcohol and other psychoactive
drugs" in 1974. Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment,
and Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-282, 88 Stat. 125. In 1988,
confidentiality assurances were expanded to cover health research more generally, in the
context of HIV infection and AIDS research.
Research funded by the Department ofJustice under the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 812, is subject to built-in confidentiality protection. 42 U.S.C.
§ 8789g (1988). Confidentiality protection, however, does not apply to the disclosure of
future criminal conduct. Additionally, state laws may provide protection. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.053 (West 1989); MItCH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 333.2631 (West 1993). Some
states have authority similar to federal confidentiality certificate provisions. SeeN.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-31-40 (Michie 1989).
265 Research on mental health or drug or alcohol abuse that is administered by certain
agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services is subject to 42 C.F.R. §§ 2a.1-.5
(1992). See supra notes 257-61 and accompanying text.
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Protection is available upon application from a named project
and is conferred in the form of a "certificate of confidentiality" issued
directly by the Assistant Secretary for Health.266 The certificate pro-
vides legal authority to resist compulsory demands for identifiable re-
search subject information. 267 An investigator with a certificate has a
legal defense against subpoena or court order similar to the physician-
patient privilege.268 The defense applies only to information about
individual subjects, not aggregate data.269
While confidentiality assurances provide strong protections of
privacy, they are subject to significant limitations. Confidentiality as-
surances are available for all research projects, and federal funding is
not required. However, the policy of the Assistant Secretary is that
certificates are issued "sparingly," that is, "only when the research is of
a sensitive nature where the protection is judged necessary to achieve
the research objectives."270 Moreover, even where a certificate is is-
sued, protection does not extend to voluntary disclosure by the re-
searcher. Furthermore, the protection does not apply to disclosure if
the subject or guardian consents either to demands for information
for audit by the funding agency or to access to records by the federal
Food and Drug Administration. Technically, the certificate appears to
relieve researchers from the obligation to comply with legal require-
ments to report conditions such as child abuse or communicable dis-
eases. However, if the researcher seeks a certificate to avoid reporting
a communicable disease, the Assistant Secretary requires a special
showing on how the research would be impaired by the reporting.271
As with other federal provisions, the protection afforded by confiden-
tiality assurances remains limited by loopholes and exceptions.
6. State Privacy Legislation
States have enacted health information privacy protection in
highly diverse ways, including statutes modeled after the federal Pri-
vacy Act 272 and FOIA.273 A few states have comprehensive medical
information statutes. California, for example, prohibits providers
from disclosing identifiable health information without the patient's
written consent, unless the disclosure is required or authorized by
266 Assistant Secretary for Health, Interim Policy Statement (June 8, 1989).
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw §§ 91-99 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1995).
273 See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 25-61-1 et seq. (1991).
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law.274 The California statute authorizes the release of information
necessary for payment for health services. 275
State "practice acts" that license physicians, nurses, or other
health care professionals and state statutes that regulate hospitals or
other institutions frequently contain provisions limiting unauthorized
disclosures of confidential patient information. 276 These statutes
often contemplate or require maintenance of manual patient records,
leaving the scope of protection afforded to automated records uncer-
tain.27 7 In addition, most states do little to regulate the informational
practices of insurers; only 14 states have adopted model privacy legis-
lation drafted by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners. 278
(i) The patient-provider privilege-The patient-provider privilege,
adopted in different forms in many states, plays a limited role in pro-
tecting privacy. It is typically a testimonial privilege, not a general ob-
ligation to maintain confidentiality. While the privilege may permit
health care professionals to refuse to disclose information about pa-
tients in court, it usually does not prevent extra-judicial disclosure to
employers or insurers. The privilege is often subject to important ex-
ceptions. For example, it does not apply where the patient puts his or
her physical or mental condition at issue in a court case (involving, for
example, personal injury or the insanity defense) or in physician li-
censure proceedings.
The patient-provider privilege applies only to disclosures made in
the course of narrowly specified relationships. In many states, the
privilege is limited to physicians and therapists and does not extend to
the great majority of health care professionals. 279 Nor does the privi-
lege apply to self help groups or other noncertified therapists. In-
deed, the privilege usually extends only to communications between
two people; although "family and group therapists may request that
their patients keep sessions confidential, the patients themselves are
not legally bound to do so."280 Even when a privilege is recognized
274 CAL. CV. CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
275 Id.
276 See Felis v. Greenberg, 273 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (liability imposed on doc-
tors for violating a duty of confidentiality express or implied in state licensure or privilege
statutes); Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1958).
277 INSTITUTE OF MEICINE, supra note 25, at 161-62; WORKGROUP FOR ELECTRONIC DATA
INTERCHANGE, supra note 30, app. 4 at 12-13.
278 See GEORGE B. TRUBOW Er AL., PRIVACY LAW AND PRAGTICE 801 (1991).
279 See BARRY R. FuRuow rr AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERALS AN PROBLEMS 221-22
(1987) (citing Barry B. Boyer, Computerized Medical Records and the Right to Privacy: The
Emerging Federal Response, 25 BuFF. L. REv. 37, 75-79 (1975)).
280 Jan Hoffm'an, Faith in Confidentiality of Therapy Is Shaken, N.Y. TmEs, June 15, 1994,
at Al, B5.
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under state law, it may be treated as qualified, with courts weighing
the need to have information against the social costs of not having it.
(ii) Disease-specific statutes-State law also contains a patchwork of
privacy protection that is disease specific. Diseases that often receive
special treatment include mental illness,28' HIV infection or AIDS,2 2
and sexually transmitted diseases.28 3 Some states also specifically pro-
tect genomic information.28 4 Sometimes these statutes confer power-
ful, near absolute, privacy protection. For example, a Massachusetts
statute prohibits any disclosure of HIV test results without the per-
son's consent.28 5 Other statutes contain so many instances where per-
sonal information can be disclosed that the exceptions swallow the
privacy rule. A Connecticut statute protecting the confidentiality of a
person's HIV status allows disclosure to dozens of ihdividuals, includ-
ing health care professionals, laboratory technicians, and emergency
workers.28 6 In general, the problems with disease-specific legislation
described above in relation to the federal alcohol and drug regula-
tions apply equally to those adopted at the state level.2 8 7
C. Common-Law Protection of Health Informational Privacy
Most states recognize a common-law duty of confidentiality apply-
ing to certain health care professionals. Thus, if a patient divulges
personal information to a health care professional believing that it is
private, the professional may be liable for extra-judicial disclosure
without the patient's consent or another valid justification.288 This
has been described as the breach of confidentiality tort,28 9 although
courts have relied on various theories of recovery,290 including inva-
281 See, e.g., Ii. REV. STAT. ch. 740 Para. 110/1 (1989).
282 See Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire, Medical Privacy Issues in the Age of AIDS: Legis:
lative Options, 16 AM.J.L. & MED. 155 (1990) (examining state legislation dealing with HIV
related problems in medical privacy laws).
283 See Gostin, supra note 150, at 46-65 (arguing immediate reform of the states' pub-
lic health statutes to respond to modem notions of disease and privacy).
284 See Gostin, supra note 178, at 109 (suggesting that the federal government should
close the gap between technological advances in genetic testing and the laws governing use
of information gained through testing).
285 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 111 § 70f (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1994).
286 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-583 (1992).
287 See supra part III.B.3.
288 See, e.g., Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985) (en banc).
289 Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REv.
1426 (1982).
290 See id. at 1437-48; TURKNTON, supra note 212, at 318-20; WORKGROUP FOR ELEC-
TRONIc DATA INTCacaANGE, supra note 30, app. 4 at 15-16.
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sion of privacy,291 implied term of contract,2 92 and breach of fiduciary
relationship.29 3 Courts have upheld breach of confidentiality claims
when the physician made an unauthorized disclosure of information
obtained in the course of a therapeutic relationship with employers2 94
or family members.2 95
These claims are weakened to the extent that courts recognize
justifications other than consent. The primary justification2 96 for non-
consensual disclosure is to protect a third party against a significant
risk of harm, such as contracting a communicable or sexually trans-
mitted infection29 7 or physical injury.29 8 Some courts, when faced
with an immediate and significant risk to an identifiable person, im-
pose a duty to protect which may include a duty to inform.29 9 Other
291 The invasion of privacy theory effectuates the interest implicated in publicity cases,
in which a person's reputation is at stake. The tort has significant doctrinal limitations in
providing an adequate remedy for breach of confidentiality because it typically requires
broad publication of the private matter, the public interest in knowing about public events
or public figures may defeat the claim, and truth may be a defense. In fact, there may be
four distinct branches of tort involved in an invasion of privacy theory: "intrusion upon
seclusion," "appropriation of name or likeness," "publicity given to private life," and "pub-
licity placing person in false light." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B-E (1977).
292 Courts sometimes incorporate a duty of confidentiality into an implied service con-
tract between the physician and patient. The expectation of confidentiality in the physi-
cian-patient relationship may be inferred from the ethical codes of medicine, the law of
the state (e.g., licensing requirements), or public policy favoring a strong therapeutic rela-
tionship, such as the maintenance of trust between doctor and patient. See, e.g., Ham-
monds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (implying
as a condition of the contract that "the doctor warrants that any confidential information
gained through the relationship will not be released without the patient's permission");
Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 674 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
293 Some courts see the therapeutic relationship as imposing on the physician a fiduci-
ary duty to the patient. A disclosure of private information without appropriate justifica-
tion is deemed a breach of the fiduciary obligation. See Ritter v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.
Luke's Medical Ctr., 532 N.E.2d 327, 331 (Ill. 1988); Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142
(Pa. 1962).
294 See Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 830-31 (Ala. 1973); Alberts v. Devine, 479
N.E.2d 113, 118 (Mass. 1985), cert. denied; 474 U.S. 1013 (1985).
295 See Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1985) (en banc);
MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 806 (1982).
296 Other justifications for disclosing confidential information include the patient's
therapeutic interests, such as when a clinical record is provided to another health care
professional responsible for the patient's care, and public health, such as when informa-
tion is disclosed pursuant to a statutory reporting requirement. See Estate of Behringer v.
Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1268-1269 (N.J. Super. 1991).
297 See Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. C. App. 1970) (finding
doctor liable to persons infected by his patient for negligent failure to diagnose a conta-
gious disease); Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 183 N.Y.S.2d 351, 357-58 (1959) (having
diagnosed a contagious disease, doctor under duty to warn members of the patienes
family).
298 See MacDonad, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801; Tarasoffv. Regents of University of California, 551
P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976).
299 See, e.g., Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 189 (D. Neb. 1980); see
also Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decision: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV.
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courts have permitted disclosures to protect third parties without cre-
ating a legal obligation to disclose.3 00
While common law protection of confidentiality probably pro-
vides the most consistent safeguards, significant gaps exist in legal du-
ties. Although most states recognize a duty of confidence inherent in
the physician-patient relationship, some jurisdictions do not.3 0 1 Even
in jurisdictions that uphold claims for breach of confidence, courts
may limit the claims to physicians; it is at best uncertain whether a
duty of confidentiality extends to other health care professionals, re-
searchers, or health care institutions, although the risk of harm from
disclosure is just as significant.3 0 2 The breach of confidentiality tort
usually requires a special kind of relationship, one in which the pa-
tient is able to demonstrate a clear expectation of privacy. When in-
formation is disclosed in the absence of this type of relationship or
when the nature of the relationship itself is ambiguous (e.g., discus-
sions with a doctor acting for an insurance company), a duty of confi-
dence may not exist.30 3 Physicians in many sectors of society may play
dual roles and have divided loyalties (e.g., physicians practicing in
prisons, in the military,30 4 or in workplace settings such as employee
assistance programs).305 Ii these settings, courts may determine that
L. REv. 358 (1976); Toni P. Wise, Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychothera-
pists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REa. 165 (1978).
300 See Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Mass. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013
(1985).
301 See Mikel v. Abrams, 541 F. Supp. 591 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aft'd, 716 F.2d 907 (8th Cir.
1983); Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322, 324 (S.D. Ga. 1957); Coralluzzo ex rel Coral-
luzzo v. Fass, 450 So. 2d 858, 859 (Fla. 1984).
302 See Collins, 156 F. Supp. at 324; Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn.
1964); but see Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1271 (NJ.
Super. 1991) (holding that hospital as well as the, health care professional has a duty to
protect confidentiality by establishing rigorous policies and procedures to prevent unau-
thorized disclosure of information).
303 See Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (N.J. 1962) (finding that both a public
and private interest militates against an obligation of confidentiality with respect to disclo-
sure of a child's condition to an insurer).
304 Martin Kasindorf, FOCUS ON Gays in Military; Threat of Dismissal Still Real N.Y.
NEWSDAY, June 24, 1994, at A15 (Serviceman's divulgence of his suspicion that he may be
gay to Marine Corps psychiatrist was disclosed to his supervisors, with the possibility of
termination from the Marines.).
305 Employee assistance programs (EAPs) provide a particularly interesting illustration
of the problematic protection of privacy afforded by the law. EAPs, available to approxi-
mately half of all U.S. employees, are presented as a free benefit for dealing with medical
and mental health problems. To many employees, there is an expectation of confidential-
ity, particularly because personal disclosures are frequently, made to physicians or counsel-
lors. Yet, employers can lawfully obtain personal health data in diverse ways: when an
employee files a workplace injury claim, EAP records are often turned over to claims ad-
justers; if the employee sues for wrongful dismissal,.discrimination, or breach of contract,
employers may be permitted to defend the claim using employee records; if the employee
is suicidal, threatens violence, or has reported child abuse, the EAP may be permitted or
required to notify government authorities; or if the supervisor suggests that the employee
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there is no clear duty to maintain confidentiality if the role relation-
ship cannot be characterized as one involving a physician and a pa-
tient.30 6 Finally, a tort action usually will succeed only against the
person who holds information in confidence.30 7 Since the "holder" of
the information can be unclear in a national or regional automated
health information system, a duty in tort may have questionable
utility308
D. Theoretical Problems with the Current Legal Protection of
Informational Privacy
The foregoing discussion suggests the existence of significant
doctrinal limitations in the law relating to breach of confidentiality:
legal protection is premised on the existence of a relationship be-
tween a physician and a patient, although most health information is
not generated within this relationship; and the duty holder is the indi-
vidual or institution that is in physical possession of the record,
although no one actually "holds" electronic data. Legal protection
that is centered on either of these premises has a distinct obsoles-
cence in an information society.
The tort rule that enforces a person's right to confidentiality in
the health care setting is grounded in the special relationship between
the physician and the patient. The law of confidentiality is justified by
the need to develop trust in the physician, so that patients will feel
free to disclose the most intimate aspects of their lives. Confidential-
ity, therefore, is designed both to enhance the therapeutic process, by
encouraging disclosures that assist in accurate diagnosis and effective
treatment, and to strengthen the bonds of the physician-patient rela-
tionship as a general social good.309
The rule of confidentiality is widely respected in law and
medicine, and rightfully so. Indeed, in the past, confidentiality has
worked reasonably well in safeguarding privacy. Much, if not all, of
the intimate knowledge of the patient was generated within the physi-
cian-patient relationship, which was often meaningful and endur-
contact the EAP, the supervisor may have the right to be informed of the visits (but not
necessarily the contents). See Ellen E. Schultz, If You Use Your Firm's Counselors, Remember
Your Secrets Could Be Used Against You, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1994, at Cl; see also KURT H.
DECKER, PRIVACY IN THE WoRKLACE: RIGHTS, PROCEDURES, AND POLCIES (1994); Ellen E.
Schultz, Medical Data Gathered by Firms Can Prove Less Than Confidential, WAUL ST.J., May 18,
1994, at Al (documenting numerous instances of disclosures by EAP professionals to em-
ployers and insurers).
306 See Bratt v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 785 F.2d 352, 357-58 (1st Cir. 1986).
307 See Humphers V. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1985) ("[O]nly one
who holds the information in confidence can be charged with a breach of confidence.").
308 See infra notes 309-12 and accompanying text.
309 See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Case Against Compulsory Casqfinding in
Controlling AIDS: Testing Screening and Reporting, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 45-47 (1987).
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ing.310 The patient's health record contained information primarily
obtained during sessions between the physician and patient, so that
the entire record was regarded as confidential. The record keepers,
moreover, were the physicians themselves who took primary responsi-
bility for the security of medical records.
The rule of confidentiality does not work nearly as well in a mod-
em information society. Health data today, in an era of electronic
information gathering, is based only in small part on the physician-
patient relationship. Many therapeutic encounters in a managed care
context are not with a primary care physician. Patients may see many
different physicians, nonphysician specialists, nurse practitioners and
other ancillary health care professionals within and outside of the
health care plan. The information obtained in these encounters has
uncertain protection under traditional rules of confidentiality.311 Fo-
cusing legal protection on a single therapeutic relationship within this
information environment is an anachronistic vestige of an earlier and
simpler time in medicine. The health record, moreover, contains a
substantial amount of information gathered from numerous primary
and secondary sources: laboratories, pharmacies, schools, public
health officials, researchers, insurers, and other individuals and insti-
tutions.3 12 The health records of patients are kept not only in the
office of a private physician or in a health plan, but also may be kept
by government agencies, regional health database organizations, or
information brokers. Databases maintained in each of these settings
will be collected and transmitted electronically, reconfigured, and
linked.313
Rules enforcing informational privacy in health care place a duty
on the entity that possesses the information.3 14 Thus, the keeper of
the record-whether it is in a private physician's office, a hospital, or
an HMO-holds the primary duty to maintain the confidentiality of
the data. The development of electronic health care networks permit-
ting standardized patient-based information to flow nationwide, and
perhaps worldwide, means that the current privacy protection system,
which focuses on requiring the institution to protect its records, needs
to be reconsidered. Our past thinking assumed a paper or automated
record created and protected by the provider. We must now envision
a patient-based record that anyone in the system can call up on a
310 Admittedly, the romanticized view of the meaningful quality of the therapeutic re-
lationship has been unraveled by a number of thoughtful scholars. Among the most tell-
ing critiques of the quality of that relationship is found in the work ofJAY KATZ, THE SILmr
WoRLD OF THE DOcTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
311 See supra notes 283-90 and accompanying text.
312 See supra notes 60-77 and accompanying text.
313 See supra notes 61-77 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 249-60 and accompanying text.
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screen. Because location has less meaning in an electronic world, pro-
tecting privacy requires attaching protection to the health record it-
self, rather than to the institution that generates it.
IV
UNIFORM NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE ACQUISITION AND
DIsCLOsuRE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
The previous Parts of this Article marshalled the arguments justi-
fying the construction of a health information system and discussed
some significant privacy concerns. This Part seeks to demonstrate
that, while privacy is an important human value, it does not transcend
other values served by comprehensive health information. Next, this
Part explains why enacting uniform national standards is most likely
to be effective in ensuring fair informational practices in the health
care system.3 15 Finally, this Part sets out the primary conceptual ele-
ments of a proposed national policy.
A. Ethical Justifications for a Health Information Infrastructure
While it would be comforting to assume that society could
achieve both the benefits of health information and reasonable levels
of privacy, it is unlikely that this will occur. There are simply too many
opportunities for use of health data in ways that are inconsistent with
the desires of patients for privacy. Given a hard choice, privacy advo-
cates might argue for the abandonment of, or a reduction in, the
plans for a comprehensive health information infrastructure. After
all, the primary justifications for collection of health data-e.g., effi-
cient administration and cost reduction-appear to be purely instru-
mental. However, a careful examination of the ethical justifications
for privacy show that privacy's moral value also is in the main deriva-
tive and based on utilitarian concerns.
The literature on privacy abounds with accounts of the moral jus-
tifications for rules of privacy. One standard account holds that the
primary justification for respecting privacy resides in the principle of
respect for autonomy. To respect the privacy of others is to respect
315 The Working Group on Privacy of the Information Policy Committee of the (Inter-
agency) Information Infrastructure Task Force published an update of the Code of Fair
Information Practices originally developed in the early 1970s. The "Draft Principles for
Providing and Using Personal Information" include: (1) a collection principle so that indi-
viduals are provided information on how data will be used and protected; (2) an acquisi-
tion and use principle, so that users of personal information must assess the impact on
privacy of data collection; (3) an education principle, so that the public will be educated
about the national information infrastructure; and (4) a fairness principle, so that individ-
uals can obtain, review, and correct their own information. Office of Management and
Budget, Draft Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information, 59 Fed. Reg.
27,206 (1994).
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their autonomous wishes not to be accessed in some respect-not to
be observed or have information about themselves made available to
others.
Respecting privacy is also an important means of fostering and
developing a sense of self and of personhood. It is difficult to imagine
how, in the absence of some level of privacy, individuals can fonnulate
autonomous preferences or, more basically, develop the capacity to be
self-governing. On this account, certain conditions of privacy are
viewed as necessary for the development or at least the fostering of
personhood.
Finally, privacy enhances the development and maintenance of
intimate human relationships-relations of trust, friendship, and love.
It is arguably one of the defining characteristics of intimate relation-
ships that they involve the sharing-freely given-of private informa-
tion, spaces, and acts. An expectation of privacy allows individuals to
confide freely in their physicians and other confidants about the most
sensitive of issues.
The ethical justifications for informational privacy also point to a
variety of economic harms that may result from unwanted disclosures
of personal health information, such as loss of employment, insur-
ance, or housing, as well as social or psychological harms. Enforcing
rules of privacy, then, can avoid many harms for individuals that flow
from the unauthorized disclosure of confidences.
Despite the well-founded claims for respecting the privacy of indi-
viduals, it is important to emphasize that many careful observers do
not see privacy as an intrinsic value. To a large extent, privacy is deriv-
ative of other, more fundamental, ethical principles such as autonomy
and respect for persons. Furthermore, to the extent that ethical justi-
fications rely on the harms resulting from the nonobservance of its
rules, privacy is of instrumental value. Privacy is important primarily
because of its utilitarian features-e.g., it promotes more effective
communication between physician and patient, enhances autonomy,
and prevents economic harm, embarrassment, and discrimination.
It would, therefore, be a mischaracterization of the ethical argu-
ments to assume the preeminence of privacy because of its normative
or intrinsic values. Equally compelling ethical claims can be made to
support a more efficient health information system. Like the justifica-
tions for privacy, these ethical arguments are principally derivative
and instrumental in value. Although justifications for privacy are
based primarily on goods for the individual, justifications for more
efficient health information are based primarily on societal or collec-
tive goods.
To the extent that more efficient use of health information would
promote access to health care, more equitable distribution of services
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to vulnerable populations, higher quality, better research, and more
effective public health interventions, substantial ethical values militate
in favor of its rapid development. The very purpose of government is
to attain through collective action human goods that individuals act-
ing alone could not realistically achieve.3 16 Chief among those
human goods is the assurance of the conditions under which people
can be healthy.317 While the government cannot assure health, it can,
within the reasonable limits of its resources, organize its activities in
ways that best prevent illness and disability, and promote health
among its population.
Health is basic to all human endeavors and, therefore, may be
regarded as a foundational justification for government action.318
Health is a necessary condition for the pursuit of livelihood, the exer-
cise of fundamental rights and privileges, and the achievement of per-
sonal satisfaction. Certainly, health information-is not sufficient to
achieve all of these goals, but it is arguably a necessary condition for
more cost-effective health services.
It is not my intention here to argue which is the most important
human good-health or personal privacy. Moreover, a rigorous
moral theory does not exist that demonstrates the primacy of one
value over the other. It is possible, however, to propose a social con-
tract that reasonably balances both human goods, while declaring
neither the winner.
Individuals already forego significant levels of privacy in order to
obtain the social goods that benefit society collectively. Many of the
collective goals in society, ranging from law enforcement and public
safety to tax collection and national security, are achieved partly by
substantial collection of personal information. Not every individual
agrees with this social contract, but all individuals benefit and, as citi-
zens of the wider community with the right of franchise, we accept the
need for diminution in individual autonomy and privacy in exchange
for substantial collective benefits. A complex modem society cannot
elevate each person's interest in privacy above other important socie-
tal interests.
As the United States intensely considers the values and effective-
ness of its health care system, it must acknowledge that one of the
burdens of achieving cost effective and accessible care is a loss of pri-
316 See generally MICHAEL WALzER, SPHERES OFJuSTncE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALrEY 64-91 (1982).
317 "Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions in
which people can be healthy." INSrrUTE OF MDniciNE, supra note 147, at 19, 36-38.
318 See NORMAN DANiELS,JUST HEALTH CAE (1985); Dan W. Brock & Norman Daniels,
Ethical Foundations of the Clinton Administration's Proposed Health Care System, 271 JAMA 1189
(1994); CharlesJ. Dougherty, Ethical Values at Stake in Health Care Reform, 268 JAMA 2409
(1992).
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vacy. In exchange for this diminution in individual rights, the govern-
ment is obliged to create reasonably strong assurances of fair
informational practices, without losing the benefits of a health infor-
mation system.
B. Justifications for a Preemptive Federal Statute: Thoughtful
Federalism
Continued reliance upon current legal safeguards is incompati-
ble with the policy objectives of an integrated health information sys-
tem for a number of reasons. A state-by-state approach to regulation
of medical information does not reflect the realities of modern health
care finance and delivery. The flow of medical information is rarely
restricted to the state in which it is generated. Such information is
routinely transmitted to other states, subject to differing legal require-
ments, for a wide variety of purposes ranging from medical consulta-
tion and research collaboration to governmental monitoring for
quality.
Further, the physical location of health information is no longer
relevant. Databases containing huge quantities of personal informa-
tion provide immediate access to a variety of eligible users in remote
locations. Thus, laws that attempt to regulate information physically
located in a particular state are ill suited to the need for efficient col-
lection of information and the enforcement of reasonable levels of
privacy in a postelectronic era.
The prospect for resolving these problems through the enact-
ment of model or uniform laws in every state is exceedingly small.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
adopted the Uniform Health Care Information Act in 1985,319 but
only two states, Montana and Washington, have enacted it320
The absence of a uniform health information policy imposes
hardships on virtually all concerned. Health care institutions, insur-
ance companies, and self-insured employers who transmit health data
through interstate commerce often do so without clear guidance re-
garding which state's laws govern or which state's courts have proper
jurisdiction to resolve disputes that may arise. Without the ability to
know and to rely on uniform regulation of information, patients lack
the basis for meaningful consent to disclosure. Lack of uniformity ad-
versely affects the integrity of health data, and the quality of care itself,
by undermining efforts to automate health records. These detriments
of state-by-state regulation of information would only be magnified in
a national health care system in which patients are entitled to cover-
319 UNIFORM HEALTH CARE INFORMATON Acr (1985).
320 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-501 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.02.005 (West
1992).
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age anywhere they live in the country and information for monitoring
quality and cost effectiveness is collected regionally, if not nationally.
Consequently, many persuasive reasons exist to adopt a uniform fed-
eral health information policy that transcends state borders.
Critics of preemption base their arguments on two points. First, a
preemption strategy does not permit states to create stronger rules of
privacy: if a state legislature were to give greater credence to the value
of privacy, it could not act in the face of a preemptive federal statute.
While many would not wish to prevent states from giving more rights
to privacy than are provided at the federal level, allowing such state
action would defeat the chief goal of a preemption strategy. By per-
mitting greater protection of privacy, a state would impede the free
flow of information across state lines. This is precisely what a preemp-
tion strategy would seek to prevent.
The second point is more general in nature. Critics argue that
preemption virtually eliminates experimentation by the states. En-
couraging states to find model solutions to complex problems-a par-
ticularly attractive feature of our federalism-is defeated by
preemption. While this aspect of federalism can be important, there
are sound reasons for reducing, if not eliminating, the variability of
state rules protecting privacy. Both people and personal data travel
freely across state lines, sometimes for a single course of treatment.
For example, a patient may be treated in an emergency room in one
state, return to his or her home state for continuing treatment, and fly
to yet another state for specialist care. Data about that individual
would circulate still more widely for medical consultations, quality as-
surance, and reimbursement. Patients, health care providers, employ-
ers, and insurers should not have to speculate as to which state's
privacy rules apply and what level of legal protection the data are af-
forded. Permitting state experimentation would impede the free flow
of information and leave the level of protection uncertain. This is not
the result that thoughtful federalism would welcome.
C. Structuring Legal Regulation to Use Information as a
Resource for the Health of the Community, Consistent
with Obligations to Individuals
In an ideal world, the nation would develop a health information
system and promise complete privacy to its citizens. Realistically,
though, a promise of complete privacy must be hollow; it cannot be
faithfully made or kept. What our government can do is create fair,
comprehensive rules, applicable throughout the United States, to en-
sure that information is acquired, used, and disseminated according
to clearly understood criteria and procedures, under mandated secur-
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ity arrangements.32' This Part suggests ways to structure the law to
allow information to be used as a resource for the health of the com-
munity, consistent with the obligation to utilize personal information
fairly.
A foundational question for the development of a federal pre-
emptive statute is where its rules should apply. A new conceptualiza-
tion of health information privacy would move beyond the traditional
approach of protecting the confidentiality of the therapeutic relation-
ship and placing duties on the physical keeper of the record.3 22
Rather, the rules need to follow the health information itself. Any
data acquired, collected, used, or disseminated within the health care
system should be protected. The health care system should be con-
strued broadly to include diagnosis, treatment, payment, and over-
sight related to the provision of any health services. Thus, all the
information in the patient's longitudinal health record should be pro-
tected, irrespective of its origin (within the therapeutic relationship or
elsewhere), use (for treatment, quality assessment, or research), me-
dium (oral, recorded, paper, microfilm, or electronic), location (in
storage, transit, or archive), dissemination (whether sent to payers,
public health departments, or employers), and user (government,
health provider, or private organization).
The rules for limiting the flow of data ought to apply equally to
all information, whether it is within the government mandated health
care system or outside it. Some reform proposals provide protection
only for data within the statutorily created health system; health data
generated or used outside of the system (e.g., for health services
purchased privately that are not covered by the guaranteed benefits
package) would not be protected.3 23 These proposals would be both
unjust and impractical. A patient's expectation of privacy remains the
same whether the services are government mandated or privately
purchased. Although the government may have a stronger claim to
regulate information practices within the system it establishes, the
raison d'etre for fair information practices (providing minimum levels
of privacy and control of personal information) is the same within and
outside of the official health care system. Also, as a practical matter, it
would be difficult to track the flow of information to determine
whether it deserves "in system" protection. Electronic data flow freely
across systems, rendering fine distinctions unworkable.
321 In order to ensure that the privacy of health care data is taken seriously, it will be
necessary to establish effective mechanisms for enforcement. This includes a private right
of action by aggrieved parties and significant penalties for persons or institutions that
breach legal requirements.
322 See supra notes 287-307 and accompanying text.
323 See, e.g., Health Security Act, supra note 88, § 5120 (Privacy standards are applicable
only to health information that is regulated by the National Health Board.).
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A national health information policy should establish uniform
and comprehensive protection to replace the current patchwork of
federal and state legislation. A thoughtful structure for balancing col-
lective interests in health and individual interests in privacy would
consider a number of separate issues. First, not all data are the same.
Depending on the method of collection, storage, and use, data may
warrant different levels of privacy protection. Second, depending on
the level of privacy to be afforded, a substantive and procedural review
of the purported justification for the collection, use, and reuse of the
data is necessary. Third, if the individual has some right to control
the use of his or her own record, it is necessary to determine the de-
gree of autonomy that ought to be afforded. Fourth, if data can only
be used for the legitimate and limited purposes for which they were
acquired, it is necessary to determine if there are circumstances when
they could be used without the patient's consent. Finally, we should
select or create an entity to oversee the national information infra-
structure, to ensure that comprehensive and accurate health data are
available in the public interest with a minimum diminution of individ-
ual privacy.
1. The Level of Privacy Protection Warranted: The Nature of the
Data-Personally Identifiable, Linkable, or Anonymous
Most legislative proposals protect only individually identifiable
health information.3 24 Yet, health information takes many forms,
each raising distinct concerns about privacy. The most serious privacy
concerns involve information that is identifiable so that others can
directly associate a record with a particular person. The inclusion of
any uniquely identifiable characteristic, such as a name, social security
number, finger print, or genetic link, classifies data as identifiable.
Information on health care records used for clinical treatment is ordi-
narily unique and can be linked to a particular person. In addition,
many researchers use identifiers for longitudinal follow-up of the
subject.
Information that is anonymous and nonlinkable poses the fewest
privacy concerns. Data that have all identifiers stripped, with no
means to associate the information with a specific person, are anony-
mous. Epidemiological research and surveillance activities such as
anonymous, unlinked serologic surveys are often structured so that
the data are anonymous. For example, many HIV seroprevalence
studies conducted from blood specimens left over from some other
lawful activity have not used identifiers.
324 See id. § 5120(a) ("individually identifiable health information"); Fair Health Infor-
mation Practices Act of 1994, H.R. 4077, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a) (3) (B) (ii) (data that
identifies the individual or can be used to readily identify the individual).
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Information that is ostensibly anonymous but can be linked to a
person presents an intermediate level of privacy concern. Some epi-
demiologic research and databases are structured so that anonymous
information can only be linked to a specific person with the use of a
highly confidential code. Data often remain linked to permit future
disclosure of test results or other data deemed vital to the health or
safety of the patient or others-for example, to inform the patient or
others of an infectious disease or genetic trait that would be helpful in
behavioral, therapeutic, or reproductive decisions. The ability to link
data, however, can cause considerable controversy. New York State,
for example, considered unlinking HIV serologic data among preg-
nant women because of the research finding that treatment of the
woman and newborn with antiviral medication significantly reduces
the risk of vertical transmission of HIV.3 2 5 Yet, linking the data poses
a potentially momentous invasion of privacy. Women who might not
wish to know their HIV status would have knowledge of a terminal
illness imposed on them without their consent 26 and might be sub-
ject to discrimination.3 27
In determining the level of privacy protection warranted, a rigor-
ous evaluation of the nature of the data held is essential. Not all data
raise the same level of privacy concerns nor warrant the same level of
legal protection. In general, the level of privacy protection warranted
increases as the data become more personally recognizable, from
anonymous, to linkable, to identifiable.
While patients have a weaker claim to control the use of noniden-
tifiable data because they are less likely to suffer personal harm by the
disclosure, it would be wrong to assume that no valid interests exist in
anonymous information. Some records do not readily identify indi-
viduals but can identify members of discrete populations. Although
the data do not identify any individual, persons in the group may feel
embarrassed or the data may reflect badly on the self-identity or integ-
rity of the group. Collection of highly sensitive data may identify a
small group such as a high school in a rural community, a racial or
ethnic group such as an American Indian tribe, or a vulnerable popu-
lation such as a poor African-American or Hispanic neighborhood.
325 Edward M. Connor et al., Reduction of Maternal-Infant Transmission of Human Immu-
nodefiieny Virus Type 1 with Zidovudine Treatmen, 331 NEw ENG.J. MFD. 1173, 1178 (1994)
(Administration of zidovudine (AZT) to the mother during pregnancy and during labor
and delivery and giving it to the infant for the first six weeks of life reduced the risk of
maternal-infant transmission of HIV approximately two thirds.).
326 Compulsory testing and treatment of the mother may or may not be considered a
moral wrong when balanced against the strong benefit to the infant. See Ronald Bayer,
Ethical Challenges Posed by Zidovudine Treatment to Reduce Vertical Transmission of HIEV, 331 NEw
ENG.J. Ma. 1223 (1994).
327 See Martha F. Rogers & Harold W.Jaffe, Reducing the Risk of Maternal-Infant Transmis-
sion of HIV: A Door is Opened, 331 NEv ENG.J. MED. 1222 (1994).
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For example, data showing a disproportionately high rate of HIV in-
fection, mental illness, alcoholism, or sexually transmitted disease in
discrete populations can serve important public health purposes, but
can also be offensive and sometimes misleading. Ideally, patients
should be informed if data are to be released to public health officials,
risk managers, or researchers in nonidentifiable form, even if a re-
quirement of informed consent for use of the data would be overly
restrictive. 328 The individual's claim to control the flow of linkable
data depends on the degree of protection afforded to prevent unau-
thorized identification of the record; the greater the privacy and se-
curity afforded to the record, the less the patient's claim to control its
release.
2. Substantive and Procedural Review for the Acquisition or Use of
Data
As will be shown,3 29 many see the collection of health data as an
inherent good. Even if the social good to be achieved is not immedi-
ately apparent, it is always possible that some future benefit could ac-
crue. A technological breakthrough may mean that some clinical
value could be achieved later by collecting data today. But despite
optimism in the power of future technology, the diminution in privacy
attributable to the collection of health data demands that the acquisi-
tion of information serve some substantial interest. The burden rests
on the collector of information, not merely to assert a substantial pub-
lic interest, but to demonstrate that it would be achieved. Informa-
tion should only be collected under the following conditions: (1) the
need for the information is substantial; (2) the collection of the data
would actually achieve the objective; (3) the purpose could not be
achieved without the collection of identifiable information; and (4)
the data would be held only for a period necessary to meet the valid
objectives.
The collection of large amounts of health information requires
not only a substantive justification, it also warrants procedural review.
For example, the development of a large database, such as a tissue
repository, can have a profound effect on the privacy of individuals
and populations. Decisions to create health databases, whether by
government or in the private sector, ought to require procedural re-
view. Some mechanism for independent review by a dispassionate ex-
pert body at a regional or national level would provide a forum for
careful examination of the justification for the collection of data, the
328 See COUNCIL OF INT'L ORG. OF MEDICAL SCIENCES, INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDE-
LINES FOR EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESEARCH (1992).
329 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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existence of thoughtful consent procedures, and the maintenance of
adequate privacy and security.
3. The Autonomy of the Individual to Control Personal Data:
Informed Consent
If a central ethical value behind privacy is respect for personal
autonomy,330 then individuals about whom data are collected must be
afforded the right to know about and to approve the uses of those
data. While legal and ethical discourse on informed consent has tra-
ditionally focused on the patient's assent to medical treatment, justifi-
cations for applying the doctrine to the release of information are
equally valid. In each case the claim of the patient is to maintain con-
trol over events that deeply affect his or her life. Unwanted medical
treatment is an invasion of the physical integrity of patients. Yet, the
economic and personal consequences of unwanted disclosures of per-
sonal information can be just as real.
As in treatment decisions, consent for the collection, use, and re-
use of information may be more illusory than real. The collectors of
information may not seek consent, they may provide insufficient infor-
mation to elicit a rational choice, and the consent form may be overly
technical and difficult for a lay person to follow. Traditional doctrine
on informed consent requires that a competent person have adequate
information to make a genuinely informed choice.33' However, few
objective standards have been developed outside of the treatment
context to measure the adequacy of consent.
To render consent meaningful, the consent process must incor-
porate clear content areas3 32 First, it is necessary to specify how pri-
vacy and security will be maintained. A simple assertion that privacy
will be respected is insufficient if the person is unaware of the steps to
be taken to protect sensitive data. Second, a statement indicating that
the person is the owner of the data and can control the use of the data
is important. Specific instructions on means of access, review, and
correction of records would provide a practical means of exercising
control over data. Third, a statement of the length of time that the
information will be stored and the circumstances when it would be
330 See discussion supra part IVA
331 See generay PAUL S. AI;PELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT. LEGAL THEORY AND
CLNICAL PRACTICE 14 (1987) (Physicians must inform patients of the nature, purpose,
risks, and benefits of any treatment they propose to perform); RUTH R. FADEN & THOMAS L.
BEAuCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986) (arguing that the ethi-
cal principle of autonomy justifies the doctrine of informed consent); Marjorie M. Shultz,
From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE LJ. 219 (1985) (rec-
ommending the creation of a legally protected right of patient autonomy).
332 The author appreciates the work in deriving these standards of Professor Robert
Weir of the National Human Genome Project andJoan Porter of the Office of Protection
from Research Risks of the National Institutes of Health.
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expunged provides assurance that information will not be kept when
it no longer serves an important public purpose. Fourth, a clear state-
ment of the degree to which third parties-for example, relatives, reg-
ulators, researchers, and public health officials-will have access to
the data is essential to understanding the level of privacy afforded.
Individuals need to know if disclosure to third parties will require ad-
ditional consent. Fifth, a clear statement about future secondary uses
of the information would provide a better understanding of all possi-
ble uses to which the data will be put. Individuals ought to know if no
secondary use will be made of the data, whether they will be given the
option of not allowing the further disclosure, and whether they will be
contacted in the future for additional consent.
A conceptual dilemma exists about whether to require consent
for all secondary disclosures. Health care professionals traditionally
make numerous disclosures that are considered "routine" and consis-
tent with the purposes for which the data are held. Standard disclo-
sures are made for treatment, payment, or oversight; to inform close
family members; to protect the health of contacts of the patient or the
public health; in emergency circumstances; when required by law
such as with subpoenas and warrants or mandatory reporting; re-
search; and law enforcement.333
The theory behind many of these routine disclosures has never
been adequately explained. Some regard the disclosures as justified
by express or implied consent, particularly when the release of infor-
mation is intended for the patient's medical or financial benefit.
Thus, the patient consents, or is presumed to consent, to the disclo-
sure of information to other health care professionals to provide ap-
propriate treatment, to insurers to assure payment, or to researchers
or regulators to maintain effective oversight or evaluation of services.
More careful thought about these disclosures reveals that they are not
always justified by the autonomous and voluntary consent of the pa-
tient. Consent may be presumed in many cases by the person's desire
to have the most effective treatment provided and paid for. However,
not every patient will trust the receiver of the information to preserve
his or her privacy; sorhe insurers, for example, might use the data to
deny insurance coverage, and some providers may disclose the infor-
mation to family or friends. Even if the patient explicitly consents, it
cannot be regarded as voluntary, for the consequence of refusal may
be the denial of services or reimbursement. Disclosure of personal
information without the meaningful consent of the patient, therefore,
requires a convincing justification beyond consent-for example, for
33 These traditional uses of health data track the categories for disclosure of health
information without patient authorization by health use trustees in the Fair Health Infor-
mation Practices Act of 1994, H.1L 4077, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 122-30 (1994).
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reasons relating to the efficient delivery and financing of health
services.
Informed consent, in its best sense, is founded on an interactive,
meaningful dialogue between a health care professional and patient.
Creative and responsive informed consent procedures can readily be
built into automated systems to supplement this personal dialogue.
These include automatic reminders of the need to obtain consent
before disclosure and of the need to renew an informed consent state-
ment after the lapse of an agreed upon time.
4. The Autonomy of the Individual to Control Personal Data: Right
to Review and Correct Personal Data
A central tenet of fair information practices is that individuals
have the right to review data about themselves and to correct or
amend inaccurate or incomplete records.83 4 This right respects a per-
son's autonomy, while assuring the integrity of data. Individuals can-
not meaningfully control the use of personal data unless they are fully
aware of their contents and can assess the integrity of the information.
Patients' confidence in the storage, use, or dissemination of personal
data often depends on the nature of the information in the file (how
sensitive it is to the particular patient), and whether it is reliable. Pa-
tients are most likely to have confidence in personal data systems if
they know the contents, have the opportunity to correct inaccuracies,
and can control their use.
Patients can also help determine if the record is accurate, trust-
worthy, and complete. Health data can only achieve essential societal
purposes if they are correct and reasonably comprehensive. While pa-
tients do not always have a detached and factual perspective on their
own records, they can identify inaccuracies or omissions. One
method, therefore, of ensuring the reliability of health records is to
provide a full and fair procedure to challenge the accuracy of records
and to make corrections.
5. Use of Data for Intended Purposes: Health Information Trustees
Entities that possess information have obligations that go beyond
their own needs and interests. In some sense, they hold the informa-
tion on behalf of the individual and, more generally, for the benefit of
all patients in the health system. A confidence is reposed in a profes-
334 At present, patients have a statutory right of access to their own health records in
approximately two-thirds of the states. JOHN CONTRUBIS, PATIENT ACCESS TO MEDICAL
REcoRDs: A STATUTORY SURVEY OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (1992). Some limitations may
have to be placed on access of patients to their records if, for example, the data identify
another individual and access would violate that person's privacy or would be harmful, or
disclosure would pose a risk to the safety of others.
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sional who possesses personal information for the benefit of others. It
is for that reason that under some conceptions, the holders of data
are referred to as "health information trustees."3 35 Health informa-
tion trustees have an obligation to use health information only for
limited purposes (a limited use rule); to disclose information only for
purposes strictly compatible with the purpose for which the data were
obtained (a limited disclosure rule); to curtail disclosure to the mini-
mum necessary to- accomplish the purpose (a minimum disclosure
rule); and to maintain an accounting for any disclosure (an account-
ing for disclosure rule).336
To some, the collection of ever-greater quantities of health data is
important, irrespective of any coherent justification. Data, however,
are not inherently good and need careful justification for their acqui-
sition or disclosure. If society asks individuals to forego some level of
privacy in exchange for a collective benefit, then the entity acquiring
the data has a burden to demonstrate that a legitimate health-related
purpose is furthered by the collection of the data. These limited pur-
poses could be specifically authorized in legislation, and would in-
clude patient care, financing, regulatory oversight, public health, and
research. If data were to be used for another valid purpose, it would
require the person's informed consent or another substantial justifica-
tion. Finally, data would be disposed of when no longer necessary to
carry out the purposes for which they were collected. 337
6. Security of Health Information Systems
The National Research Council observed that "[t]he nation
needs computer technology that supports substantially increased
safety, reliability, and, in particular, security."338 As automated sys-
tems increasingly contain standardized health information capable of
being transmitted over electronic networks, "society becomes more
vulnerable to poor systems design, accidents that disable systems, and
attacks on computer systems."33 9 While maintaining adequate security
entails financial cost, the economic and privacy implications of leaving
sensitive data inadequately secured would be considerable. Opportu-
nities for using electronic networks may be lost if there is serious pub-
lic mistrust of their safety.
335 See Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1994, H.R. 4077, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 101 (1994).
336 Id. § 121 (rules limiting trustees' use of information).
337 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE.NES ON
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (Paris 1981).
338 SYSTEM SECURITY STUDY COMM., NAT'L RSEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTERS AT RISK: SAFE
COMPUTING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2 (1991).
339 Id.
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Although making a computer system one-hundred percent se-
cure is not feasible, careful planning and use of technology can pro-
vide a great deal of protection of records.3 40 Technological advances
in electronic systems are proceeding at an accelerated pace. Data pro-
tection policies, if they are to be effective in this rapidly changing envi-
ronment, cannot be tied to specific systems and system capabilities.
Rather, government must establish security protection guidelines that
define system goals but do not specify how these goals will be reached.
The current voluntary process has not resulted in the development of
a comprehensive set of standards, procedures, and practices needed
to ensure the security of automated systems. The promulgation of na-
tional security standards and guidance would include the following
elements: quality control, access control on code as well as data, user
identification and authentication, protection of executable code, se-
curity logging, a security administrator, data encryption, operational
support tools to assist in verifying the security state of the system, in-
dependent audits of the system, and hazard analysis. 341 Levels of ac-
cess can also be established that recognize the varying degrees of
security required for differing kinds of information.3 42
340 See Colin J. Bennett, Computers, Personal Data, and Theories of Technology: Comparative
Approaches to Privacy Protection in the 1990s, 16 Sos. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 51 (1991) (recom-
mending a holistic approach to regulation that encompasses the relationship between or-
ganizational practices and information technology).
341 The creation of audit trails for monitoring all instances of access to and disclosure
of automated health records on individuals involves computers producing logs of all in-
stances when files have been accessed. The logs can be consulted by supervisors and secur-
ity officers when complaints are received from individuals or when a suspicious pattern of
access occurs. Thus, patterns of staff browsing in patients' records might be identified and
questioned by data protection officers. See generally BRUCE, supra note 45, at 29-69 (sug-
gesting procedural methods for health care providers to protect patient privacy); COMMIS-
SION D'ACCES A L'INFORMATION, MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SECURITY OF
COMPUTERIZED RECORDS OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES NErwoRK CLIENrs (April 1992);
OTA DEFENDING SECRETS, supra note 58, at 131-48 (examining federal policies directed at
protecting information in electronic communication systems); OTA FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6, at 99-125 (examining the federal use of electronic data bases
and public policy concerning privacy); ROTHFEDER, supra note 170, at 124-52 (arguing that
existing privacy protection laws are inadequate and advocating the establishment of a fed-
eral Data Protection Board; R. ROSENBERG, PRIVACY IN THE COMPUTER AGE (Computer Pro-
fessionals for Social Responsibility, No. CL-100-3, 1989) (suggesting ways that individual
and society can assure greater privacy).
342 See SYSTEM SECURITY STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 337, at 80-88 (discussing differ-
ent models that allow different levels of access); OTA PROTECTING PRIVACY, supra note 6, at
89-99 (discussing safeguards, e.g., cryptography, which can be used to ensure the privacy of
medical records).
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7. Oversight of the Health Information System: Data Protection and
Security Panel
Establishing a National Data Protection and Security Panel would
fill a major gap in America's privacy and security framework.3 43 Such
an entity would have several responsibilities essential for the develop-
ment and implementation of effective privacy and security in the
health care system. The panel would: (1) set privacy and security
standards through interpretive rules, guidelines, or both that must be
followed by participants in the health care system; (2) monitor and
evaluate the implementation of standards set by statute, regulations,
or guidelines; (3) sponsor or conduct research, studies, and investiga-
tions; (4) supplement other mechanisms in the health care system
through which citizens question the propriety of information col-
lected and used by various participants in the system; (5) advise the
President, the Congress, government agencies, states, and other par-
ticipants in the health care system; (6) support the development of
fair and comprehensible consent processes governing the disclosure
and re-disclosure of information to authorized persons, for authorized
purposes, at authorized times; (7) fund pilot projects demonstrating
the technology required for implementing security standards and
sharing information in the health care setting; and (8) work with the
health provider community to foster development of security practices
responsive to their goals of providing effective health care.
CONCLUSION
A national health information policy that encourages the collec-
tion of vast amounts of electronic data while creating uniform rules
for handling these data may be the best way of reconciling equally
compelling public and private claims. Yet it remains far from perfect.
To be sure, such a policy defeats legitimate privacy claims: it permits
innumerable access by authorized professionals and organizations for
treatment, reimbursement, regulation, research, and public health
and fals to tightly circumscribe the scope of permissible disclosures or
redisclosures for "compatible" or "routine" purposes. The potential
for collection, matching, and reconfiguration of immense quantities
of electronic data is real.
These human burdens in loss of privacy are not trivial. Yet, the
need to measure the diminution in privacy against collective expecta-
343 The creation of a data protection entity has been recommended by members of
Congress and by privacy experts. See Data Protection Act'of 1991, H.R. 685, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991) (Bill introduced by Rep. Wise would create a national board to recom-
mend privacy protections for information); Marc Rotenberg, In Support of a Data Protection
Board in the United States, 8 GOV'T INFo. Q. 79 (1991) (arguing that a national board is
necessary to provide a reasonable level of protection of information).
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tions of considerable benefit under a national health care system is
inescapable. As a general proposition, the government's claim of
compelling advantage through collection of these data has been as-
serted with thought and rigor. This provides a general justification
for development of the kind of ambitious health information system
currently contemplated. But those who watch the government will in-
sist on more. They will require that the laudable health goals asserted
are actually achieved; that the social goods from collection of data are
not assumed but are carefully justified before each disclosure; that less
intrusive nonidentifiable data are used whenever they could achieve
the asserted health objective; and that where privacy interests must be
implicated, all holders of data comply with rigorous uniform stan-
dards established through federal legislation.
